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ARTICLES
DISPLACING DISSENT: THE ROLE OF "PLACE"
IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Thomas P. Crocker*
INTRODUCTION
Would the principle of free speech have value if there were no public
place to speak? What would be the point of dissent if political differences
were relegated to the realm of "freedom of thought," disappearing into the
silent mental lives of those who harbor political disagreement with
prevailing orthodoxy? What would be the value of free speech if public
dissent disappeared? These are not idle questions. Under current First
Amendment jurisprudence, public officials exercise increasingly effective
means of displacing dissent through the regulation of place. By rendering
dissent invisible, official control over the location of speech threatens a
core, even romantic, value protected by the First Amendment.1
There can be no doubt about the importance of the "freedom to think as
you will" 2 to our understanding of the First Amendment. 3  Yet the
protection of the First Amendment is widely thought to extend far beyond
the freedom to think; it also includes the freedom "to speak as you think."'4
If the freedom to speak as one thinks is merely a freedom to speak privately
to oneself, then one might wonder why all the fuss over the First
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. J.D., Yale; Ph.D.,
Vanderbilt. I wish to thank Owen Fiss for his invaluable encouragement to pursue this
project. I would also like to thank Lisa Eichhorn and Robin Wilson for superb suggestions.
I am grateful to Adrianne Carr and Jane Merrill for their helpful research assistance.
1. "The First Amendment has a special regard for those who swim against the current,
for those who would shake us to our foundations, for those who reject prevailing authority."
Steven H. Shiffrin, Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America 10 (1999) [hereinafter
Shiffrin, Dissent]; see also Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and
Romance (1990). The figure of the dissenter, and the importance of dissent, are well-
embedded in popular imagination. Indeed, "[e]veryone, it seems, believes in dissent."
Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745, 1746 (2005).
2. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
3. Indeed, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes emphasized freedom of thought, noting, "[If
there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any
other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought that we hate." United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55
(1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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Amendment? 5 Accordingly, the First Amendment in general, and the Free
Speech Clause in particular, encompass more than speech uttered behind
closed doors. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "[t]he freedom of
speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least
the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern
without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment."'6 Public
debate presupposes the existence of places where the public can engage in
discourse and access to public fora where these practices may occur. To
engage in public discourse is to be situated in relation to other persons in
terms of place and space.
Because where we speak is often just as important as what we say,
increased efforts by the government to restrict the location of speech
threaten to undermine the guarantees of the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court's current free speech doctrine permits the imposition of
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech without raising
constitutional concerns. 7 Government officials have seized upon this
doctrinal permissiveness to develop practices that suppress and control the
content of speech by regulating the place of speech. Such suppression and
control is most (in)visible in the case of political dissent. Dissent or
political protest is expressed most effectively in public, especially at places
where government officials-above all the President-appear. To convey a
message of dissent is to convey no message at all if it is spoken where no
other persons-much less the targeted government officials-can hear or
see the message. It is precisely this aim-the elimination of dissenters'
ability to appear as dissent to specific audiences-that has been the object
of much recent regulation.
Regulation of place has stifled political dissent by creating special
"protest zones" at presidential appearances, 8 by deploying free speech cages
at national party conventions,9 and by designating large areas of urban
centers as "restricted zones."10 More generally, officials control or displace
5. Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo emphasized the fundamental importance of the
freedom of thought and speech: "Of that freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
6. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).
7. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (upholding a state
statute requiring a license to march on city streets because the state "cannot be denied
authority to give consideration, without unfair discrimination, to time, place and manner in
relation to the other proper uses of the streets").
8. James Bovard, Quarantining Dissent: How the Secret Service Protects Bush from
Free Speech, S.F. Chron., Jan. 4, 2004, at D1.
9. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F.
Supp. 2d 61, 74 (D. Mass. 2004) (describing a demonstration zone as an "internment
camp"); John Kifner, Demonstrators Steer Clear of Their Designated Space, N.Y. Times,
July 26, 2004, at P3.
10. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a
"restricted zone" covering downtown Seattle that excluded World Trade Organization
(WTO) protestors was a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction).
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speech by establishing university "free speech zones,"' I limiting mass
protests such as those in New York against the Iraq War,12 and restricting
use of sidewalks, 13 malls, 14 and airports. 15
The simple regulation of place has made dissent effectively invisible,
practically pointless, and criminally dangerous. For example, when
President George W. Bush visited Columbia, South Carolina, in 2002, Brett
Bursey sought to welcome him with a sign that read "No War for Oil.' 16
Standing among others who were waiting to greet the President without
messages of dissent, Bursey was ordered by officials to remove himself to a
designated protest zone three quarters of a mile away and out of sight of the
President. 17 When he refused, he was arrested, charged with violating 18
U.S.C. § 1752,18 and later convicted of violating Secret Service restrictions
on a person's presence where the President is temporarily visiting. 19
Bursey was not singled out simply because he wished to convey a message
of dissent, but because he wished to convey a message of dissent in a
particular place and in the presence of other persons standing along a
roadway to greet the President as he passed. By the simple regulation of
place, government officials succeeded in suppressing dissent.20
Many commentators lament the decline of the public sphere brought
about by the increased organization of modem life.21 Quite apart from
rising concerns over security, modem life has diminished the role of
traditional places where the public might gather and mingle, such as town
greens, parks, sidewalks, and pedestrian streets.22  Justice Anthony
11. See generally Carol L. Zeiner, Zoned Out! Examining Campus Speech Zones, 66 La.
L. Rev. 1 (2005).
12. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, From New York to Melbourne, Cries for Peace, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 16, 2003, at Al.
13. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (upholding restrictions on speech on
a sidewalk leading to a post office).
14. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (finding no First Amendment right to
exercise free speech at a privately owned shopping center).
15. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (upholding
regulations on speech in airport terminals).
16. See Jonathan M. Katz, Thou Dost Protest Too Much: An Old Law Turns Protestors
into Threats Against the President, Slate, Sept. 21, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2107012/.
17. Id.
18. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1752 (West 2006). The statute makes it illegal intentionally to
"impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, to
engage in disorderly or disruptive conduct in, or within such proximity to, any building or
grounds" where the President is visiting. Id. § 1752(a)(2).
19. The Fourth Circuit upheld Brett Bursey's conviction by U.S. Magistrate Bristow
Marchant. United States v. Bursey, 416 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2005).
20. This story is similar to many others, with the exception that Bursey was convicted of
violating § 1752. See Bovard, supra note 8; Katz, supra note 16.
21. See, e.g., Jiirgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Thomas Burger trans., MIT Press 1991)
(1962); Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990); Cass R. Sunstein,
The Future of Free Speech, in Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modem Era 285, 285-
87 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
22. See Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 27-34 (2001).
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Kennedy has noted this problem: "Minds are not changed in streets and
parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant
interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in mass
and electronic media."'23 Although the Internet provides a vibrant new
forum for discursive practices, there is a countervailing worry that the
ability to select content to an ever more refined degree will lead to greater
social fragmentation. 24  Moreover, the Internet does not provide for
serendipitous occasions to encounter others face-to-face or to discover the
new or the strange in both a social and public setting.25 Trends of modem
life and government regulation of public fora have led to the disappearance
of meaningful public discourse, dissent, and protest from the public sphere.
Thus, the combination of the physical displacement of traditional public
spheres with the strategic disruption of political protest provides ample
reason to question whether the bland treatment of place in the Court's
current First Amendment jurisprudence appropriately protects, let alone
enables, the values of free speech.
This Article argues that within the free speech tradition, we need to
reconsider the ways that public policy, legal doctrine, and constitutional
theory treat the role and value of "place" in public discursive practices. A
refocused consideration of the essential role of "place" is necessary to both
understand and achieve the values of free speech.
The traditional approach to place in First Amendment jurisprudence
depends on "content-neutral" analysis and reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions. Consequently, courts and critics (1) largely ignore the
need to protect places and spaces for public discourse; (2) presuppose the
existence of an autonomous self who seeks to express ideas formed
"privately" outside of public discursive practices; and (3) fail to recognize
the value of contributing something new to public discourse. Furthermore,
free speech theory and policy have paid too little attention to the importance
of not only protecting, but also fostering the spaces and places where free
speech might flow. 26
23. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 802-03
(1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
24. In a park, one cannot avoid the serendipitous encounter with strangers, and perhaps
with strange ideas. On the Internet, one can "filter" out chance encounters, receiving only
the content one desires.
25. On the role of face-to-face encounters with others in public space, see Sunstein,
supra note 22, at 27-34; Young, supra note 21. On the ethical importance of face-to-face
encounters, see Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority 174
(Alphonso Lingis trans., 1969) ("To see the face is to speak of the world. Transcendence is
not an optics, but the first ethical gesture."); see also Robert Eaglestone, Ethical Criticism:
Reading After Levinas 129-70 (1997).
26. Steven Shiffrin ably argues that the First Amendment needs to do more than simply
protect dissent. "Free Speech theory should be taken beyond protecting or tolerating dissent:
the First Amendment should be taken to reflect a constitutional commitment to promoting
dissent." Shiffrin, Dissent, supra note 1, at 91.
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This Article contributes to our thinking about the need to protect and
foster the "place" for free speech. 27 Part I outlines the broad features of the
current problem of place in the context of a rich free speech tradition. Part
L.A provides a short background on the development of this tradition. Part
I.B focuses specifically on case law charting the development and current
character of place restrictions.
Part II demonstrates that free speech policy too frequently regulates place
to the detriment of speech in ways that are harmful to at least two
fundamental First Amendment values: autonomy and collective self-
determination. Much of First Amendment discourse focuses on attempting
to define the core value of free speech. This pits advocates of autonomy in
theoretical conflict with advocates of values such as deliberation and
collective self-determination. 28 To understand what motivates free speech
analysis, scholars, critics, and courts have been keen to determine what
value(s) animate the First Amendment. Analyzing two of the most widely
shared of these values-autonomy and collective self-determination-Part
II argues that advocates of each of these values have largely ignored the use
of place to restrict free speech in ways that have detracted from the very
values they seek to promote.
Ultimately, this Article argues that neither autonomy nor democracy can
flourish if the public places in which these values are realized cease to exist.
In pursuit of this argument, Part III turns to a discussion of Hannah
Arendt's political theory to suggest that the very possibility of autonomy
and democracy depends on fostering public places where speech and
autonomy may appear.
Part IV argues that in three relevant doctrinal areas-media access, the
public forum, and captive audiences-the Supreme Court consistently fails
to protect speech from being regulated by place. One way of proscribing
speech without directly proscribing speech is to ask and answer a prior
question: "Where is one allowed to speak?" Quite often, this question is
27. For other recent contributions to thinking about place, see generally Timothy Zick,
Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 439 (2006)
(borrowing concepts from anthropology and cultural geography to map "expressive
topography" for purposes of First Amendment analysis); Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial
Tactics, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 581 (2006) (diagnosing a problem with use of "spatial tactics," and
advocating a role for what he calls "expressive place").
28. Compare Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405,
1410 (1986), with Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
95 Mich. L. Rev. 1517, 1523 (1997) (reviewing Owen Fiss, Liberalism Divided: Freedom of
Speech and the Many Uses of State Power (1996)). See generally Morris Lipson, Note,
Autonomy and Democracy, 104 Yale L.J. 2249, 2275 (1995) (defending a version of Fiss's
collectivism against Post's individualist challenge by arguing that "some autonomy depends
upon inputs to the citizen from outside her, and hence depends upon a kind of assistance
from others"). Moreover, some observers see this theoretical conflict over core First
Amendment values as an actual threat to free speech by the advocates of deliberative
democracy. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty,
59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 225, 226 (1992) ("So it is with no pleasure that I note that in this country,
in classrooms and law reviews, the great liberal ideal of free expression is under attack.").
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raised to address legitimate policy considerations. There are, in fact,
appropriate times, places, and means of expressing ideas to the public.
Using sound trucks to convey a message in a residential neighborhood
while people are trying to rest or sleep would not be the appropriate place,
time, or manner to express an idea.29 Speakers can disrupt the lives of
others. The possibility of unwelcome disruption creates an opportunity to
regulate the place for speech. However, these regulations have expanded
beyond the clear cases of legitimate policy (sound trucks) to questionable
attempts to avoid disruption ("protest zones"). 30 Government actors may
control otherwise protected speech content by basing their restrictions on
the prior question of the place of speech, regardless of whether such
regulation disrupts the expectations of a "captive audience" 31 or frustrates
attempts to address others in a putative "public forum." For example, it is
possible, simply by regulating a speaker's location in a content-neutral
manner, to limit or eliminate the speaker's ability to convey a message to a
desired audience. To evaluate the propriety of such restrictions, the
Supreme Court has developed the "public forum" doctrine. However, as
Part IV will demonstrate, this doctrine provides little effective
constitutional review of regulations other than those imposed on "traditional
public fora," such as sidewalks and parks. 32
It is important to note that this Article does not argue that, once the
theoretical underpinnings of the First Amendment are clearly defined,
judicial policy and doctrine concerning place will follow automatically.
Rather, by gaining a clearer theoretical understanding of the role of place in
the development of meaningful autonomy and deliberative democracy, we
will possess new conceptual tools to enable fresh approaches to the theory,
policy, and practice of the First Amendment.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEM: SUPPRESSING SPEECH BY
REGULATING PLACE
A. The First Amendment Tradition: An Overview
Professor Harry Kalven's seminal work bears a suitably lofty title
describing the development of First Amendment jurisprudence: A Worthy
Tradition.33 Indeed, this tradition is worthy in many ways. Not only has it
tended, over time, towards the protection of speech, but it has also fostered
29. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding restrictions on use of sound
trucks).
30. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
31. The "captive audience" doctrine is addressed infra Part IV.C.
32. Even these traditional public fora can be subject to prior licensing restraints under
the theory that the state can operate as a parliamentarian to provide order and avoid a
cacophony of voices in the public sphere. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941) (upholding convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for failing to obtain a permit before
engaging in a parade or procession).
33. Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America (1988).
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growth in the protection of human autonomy, enabling people to direct the
course of their lives through discourse. 34
This worthy free speech tradition began in 1919 with Schenck v. United
States35 with rather inauspicious results. 36 In an opinion by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on political speech,
thereby quashing robust public debate at the exact point where the dominant
powers feared political dissent might be most effective. 37 Indeed, if the
government had not been motivated by fear-fear that individuals might
begin to resist the draft, fear that criticisms of the war might capture popular
thinking, and fear that dissent might generally disrupt the singular war
effort-and, if political speech was incapable of changing beliefs and
opinions, then it might have been easy to dismiss the rantings of dissent as
harmless noise, the cacophony of confused minds. However, the
government was motivated by fear, and speech does sometimes prove
persuasive, even at the expense of truth. 38  Indeed, an ancient battle
between the philosophers-guardians of the search for truth-and the
sophists-guardians of rhetoric-resonated in this fear.39  The state,
seeking to maintain a monopoly on "truth," feared the persuasive force of
rhetoric which, according to the state, could not possibly intimate truths.40
The free speech tradition, quite fortunately, veered from this precipitous
path as a partial consequence of Holmes's subsequent dissents from the
34. Kalven elegantly expresses the dialogic goal of the present Article:
[T]here has been over the years at the level of the Supreme Court a sort of Socratic
dialogue going on between the Court and the society as to the meaning of freedom
of speech .... As with Socrates, the dialogue appears to be eternally open-
ended-a definitive, fully understood answer will never be reached and so the
process must go on with another and yet another question being put.
Id. at 23.
35. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Holmes, J.); see also Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919) (Holmes, J.).
36. Kalven, supra note 33, at 125 (noting that the tradition, had it followed Judge
Learned Hand in his decision in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1917), would "almost certainly have been better"). Judge Hand, construing the Espionage
Act of 1917 at issue two years later in Schenk, engages in strict statutory construction in
order to protect speech from the censor. See Masses Publ'g Co., 244 F. at 537-40.
37. See Debs, 249 U.S. at 211. Eugene Debs, a Socialist Party leader who received
nearly one million votes for President in 1912, was convicted of violating the Espionage Act
of 1917 for comments deemed to incite others to obstruction of the draft. Id. at 212. The
Court upheld his conviction and ten-year sentence on each count. Id. at 212, 216.
38. Fear that words might have detrimental effects on national morale or unity led to a
number of convictions during the World War I era. The Court saw certain speech acts as
tending to cause insubordination as a natural, though inchoate, effect of speech. See
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (upholding a conviction under the
Espionage Act); see also Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (same); Pierce v. United
States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920) (same); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) (same).
See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime 136-220 (2004).
39. For more on this classical debate, see Plato's Gorgias and The Republic.
40. See infra Part IV.B for more on truth as a value of free speech as enunciated by the
"marketplace of ideas" theory.
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precedents he authored in Schenk and Debs v. United States.41 Speech
began to win, not because of any necessary connection between content and
truth, but because the Court began to recognize the value of exchanging
ideas. This idea is encapsulated in Holmes's notion of a "free trade in
ideas," 42 language that has persistently captivated the imagination of the
Supreme Court.43 Judicial commitment to speech during times of perceived
crises, however, continues to waver. For instance, the Court condoned the
suppression of speech deemed politically threatening to the status quo
during both the first "red scare" following World War 144 and the second
"red scare" of the early Cold War-McCarthy era.45
Censors can detract from the Court's ability to use the First Amendment
to protect speech perceived to be dangerous. In opposing censorship,
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., observed, "[I]f the recent lessons of history
mean anything, it is that the First Amendment does not evaporate with the
mere intonation of interests such as national defense, military necessity, or
domestic security."46
Over time, however, the free speech tradition won many more victories
over the power of the censor47 in cases such as New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,48 Brandenberg v. Ohio,4 9 Miller v. California,50 and Texas v.
Johnson.51 In each case, the domain of the censor was restricted, and the
important place of speech in our political and individual lives was preserved
as central to the functioning of a participatory democratic government. The
41. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(arguing, in an opinion joined by Justice Louis Brandeis, that absent a present danger, beliefs
,should be freely expressed because every idea is an incitement); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing the antidote to false ideas is more
speech through "competition of the market"); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
42. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 146 n.5 (1966).
44. See, e.g., Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652 (upholding the conviction of a Socialist Party
member for advocating criminal anarchy). After Whitney and Gitlow, the Court began to
overturn convictions for subversive advocacy. See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927).
45. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951) (upholding convictions under
the Smith Act, reasoning under Holmes's clear and present danger test that "the words
cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until theputsch is about to be
executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited").
46. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 852 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. I do not mean to imply that there is some state of public discourse that is censorship-
free. All speech is constrained in some way such that all speech is the product of censorship
broadly conceived as constraint. As "use of the word censorship presupposes that
censorship is a relatively identifiable subset of the set of human activity, then it makes no
sense to identify as such a subset something that is part and parcel of all human activity."
Frederick Schauer, The Ontology of Censorship, in Censorship and Silencing: Practices of
Cultural Regulation 147, 149 (Robert C. Post ed., 1998).
48. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Brennan, J.).
49. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Brennan, J.).
50. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (Burger, C.J.).
51. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Brennan, J.).
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free speech tradition has proven itself worthy of protecting speech from the
tentacles of the state censor; the Socratic dialogue over the meaning of free
speech of which Kalven speaks continues.52
Despite the many successes of this most worthy tradition, the prohibition
of content-based regulation has ossified speech under particular existing
structures. There is considerable tension between what has evolved into the
public forum doctrine and the other means by which speech is restricted
through the regulation of place. With Justice Holmes sitting on the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, place did not immediately find a
home within the free speech tradition. Holmes wrote, "For the
Legislature... to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no
more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the
owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. '53
Over time, however, place became part of the tradition. The free speech
tradition rejected Holmes's early statement regarding place, developing a
view that public fora "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of
the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions." 54 Under what became public forum analysis, place has had a
rather inauspicious presence in both Supreme Court doctrine as well as in
scholarly criticism, typically receiving limited review or attention. 55 To be
sure, the public forum analysis originated deep within the free speech
tradition. Kalven, in discussing Cox v. Louisiana,56 which cautiously
upheld the right of public protest, stated "that in an open democratic society
the streets, the parks, and other public places are an important facility for
public discussion and political process. They are, in brief, a public form
that the citizen can commandeer." 57
52. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
53. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895). The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the state court ruling in Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897) ("The right
to absolutely exclude all right to use, necessarily includes the authority to determine under
what circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the lesser.").
54. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting distribution of
leaflets on public property violates the First Amendment).
55. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding an
injunction against a buffer zone at a women's reproductive clinic); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding a noise restriction); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1988) (upholding a regulation on picketing near a private residence); Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding a regulation on sleeping in a
traditional public forum-a public park); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding a regulation on leafleting at a state fair); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding regulations on noise from picketing near a public
school); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding trespass conviction for
protesters at a jail). But see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (striking down a
regulation against picketing in front of the Supreme Court).
56. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
57. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 1, 11-12.
2007] 2595
FORDHAMLAWREVIEW
Yet the focus on speech, abstracted from its physical context, has shaped
an attitude that is focused on the speech act. Consequently, there is
relatively little concern for the regulation of the speech place. Indeed,
given that the free speech tradition's focus has been on statutes like the
Espionage Act of 1917,58 which made it illegal merely to say certain
words,59 it is hardly surprising that the doctrine has been overwhelmingly
concerned with speech acts. It is with this brief background that this Article
now turns to the contemporary setting, where the censor is less concerned
with words than with place.
B. The Contemporary Problem: Displacing Dissent
As we have already observed, one way to regulate speech is to regulate
the place it is uttered. For instance, in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc.60 and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,61 the Supreme Court
upheld city zoning ordinances targeting certain types of speech because of
the ordinances' content neutrality, even though the ordinances severely
limited the places in which otherwise protected speech might occur. The
Court devised and relied upon a content-neutral theory of "secondary
effects" to justify content-based zoning restrictions on adult theaters. 62 The
secondary effects of low-value speech, such as adult films or nude dancing,
generally include neighborhood decline and increased crime.63 The effect
of the ordinances in Young and Renton was to leave very little land on
which such adult businesses could operate. In Renton, for instance, little
more than five percent of the land within the city did not fall under the
ordinance. 64 Despite this severe limitation on the place of otherwise
protected speech, the Court analyzed the zoning restrictions as if they were
ordinary time, place, and manner regulations65 and concluded that the
restrictions served a substantial governmental interest while allowing for
58. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 1, 40 Stat. 217 (amended 1997).
59. Charles T. Schenk, for instance, violated the Espionage Act by, inter alia,
denigrating the draft as "despotism in its worst form and a monstrous wrong against
humanity in the interest of Wall Street's chosen few" in leaflets distributed to military
conscripts. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 49, 51 (1919).
60. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
61. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
62. Id. at 47; Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34.
63. "The ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail
trade, maintain property values, and generally 'protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the
city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life,' not to suppress the
expression of unpopular views." Renton, 475 U.S. at 48; see also City of Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (upholding a city ordinance banning more than
one adult entertainment business in the same building); City of Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S.
277 (2000) (upholding a ban on public nudity on secondary effects grounds); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (upholding Indiana's public indecency statute prohibiting
nude dancing).
64. Renton, 475 U.S. at 53.
65. Id. at 53-54.
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reasonable alternative avenues of communication.66 Because the Court has
never clearly articulated the difference between primary and secondary
effects on speech, 67 it seems that many effects could be classified as
secondary and, thus, permit the greater deference afforded content-neutral
restrictions. 68 It is easy to imagine the government positing security and
public safety concerns as legitimate secondary effects in order to justify
otherwise content-based speech restrictions. Under this regime, content-
neutral considerations validate many forms of place regulation, having the
practical effect, as in Renton,69 of eliminating the regulated speech from the
public sphere. This regulatory permissiveness has created an ever-
increasing reliance on special zoning regulations to suppress public speech
and protest.
For example, recent Secret Service crowd control practices at public
appearances by the President and other government leaders severely limit
the free flow of public speech. 70 While supporters may congregate in full
view of the President, Secret Service policy requires those who wish to
protest to do so in "protest zones." 71 These "zones" are often out of sight of
both the presidential motorcade and any of the participants at presidential
events.72 This policy has affected the peaceful protests of thousands of
people at events across the country. 73 Although a number of protestors and
would-be protestors have sued to enjoin the Secret Service's policy, none
have succeeded, and the practice continues unabated. 74
66. Id.
67. One attempt to make sense of the doctrine reasons, "One may zone such speech or
pass regulations that have the effect of restricting such speech if the rationale for the
regulations is not to suppress the speech but instead to control effects that are not clearly
forms of direct reaction to the speech." Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double
Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1135, 1150 (2003). Professor Shiffrin, however, does not think
the distinction between primary and secondary effects is sensible. See id. at 1164-71.
68. Moreover, the Court is entirely unclear about what counts as reasonable alternative
avenues of communication. See Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524,
1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding cost is not a factor, but merely whether "any site is part of
an actual market" for the regulated enterprise generally).
69. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
70. See generally ACLU, Freedom Under Fire: Dissent in Post-9/11 America (2003),
available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/17281pub20031208.html (follow
"Download" hyperlink).
71. Id. at 11, 13.
72. Id.
73. See Your Right to Say It... But Over There, Chi. Trib., Sept. 28, 2003, § 2, at 3
[hereinafter Your Right to Say It].
74. The primary obstacle to gaining an injunction is demonstrating the prospect of
imminent injury from the policy under the requirements of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1983). See Acom v. City of Philadelphia, No. 03-4312, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8446, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2004) (finding future threat of arrest at a presidential event too
attenuated for injunctive relief); see also Elend v. Sun Dome, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1206,
1210 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding no threat of imminent injury sufficient for injunctive relief
against "First Amendment zone" practices at a presidential event where the plaintiffs were
arrested).
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Prohibiting speech simply on the content or viewpoint expressed is
facially unconstitutional. 75 A policy of restricting the speech of those who
would protest presidential policies, if a simple matter of viewpoint
restriction, would thus be presumptively invalid. But the policy is not
strictly viewpoint discrimination. The Secretary of the Treasury has
statutory authority under 18 U.S.C. § 1752 to "prescribe regulations
governing ingress or egress to such buildings and grounds" where the
President and his staff have "temporary residence." 76  The statute
criminalizes entering or remaining in "any posted, cordoned off, or
otherwise restricted area of a building or grounds where the President or
other person protected by the Secret Service is or will be temporarily
visiting." 77 The Secret Service's putative motivation is not political. 78 Its
motivation is to protect the President, and those who are visibly protesting
are said to provoke a greater security threat to the President. The protesters'
point of view does not form the basis for the regulation; rather, speech
restrictions are justified by the "secondary effects" that follow from their
speech-secondary effects related to the prevention of crime, a core
consideration in Renton.79 It appears that by simply zoning speech to
another place, speech is not suppressed but merely relocated so as to
prevent potential criminal activity. The policy goes beyond simple
viewpoint discrimination, because, on the surface, it is designed only to
reach certain secondary effects. In reality, however, the application of such
restrictions has a far more worrying effect.
Political protesters have confronted further restrictions on the place of
their speech in the form of "demonstration zones" or "pens." Individuals
and groups who wished to engage in political protest at the Democratic
National Convention in 2004 sought an injunction in federal court against a
"designated demonstration zone," which the district court described as "a
grim, mean, and oppressive space whose ominous roof is supported by a
forest of girders that obstruct sight lines throughout, '80 for which "[t]he
overall impression created ... is that of an internment camp. '81  In
language that distanced the court from its decision, the district judge
concluded that he could not "say that the design itself is not narrowly
75. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-83 (1992); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
76. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1752(d) (2006).
77. Id. § 1752(a)(1)(ii).
78. Interestingly, when contacted by Salon.com to comment on the ACLU's suit, Secret
Service spokesman John Gill claimed that "[t]he Secret Service is message-neutral," but
never actually claimed that the protestors constitute a special threat. Dave Lindorff, Keeping
Dissent Invisible, Salon.com, Oct. 16, 2003,
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2003/10/16/secret-service/print.html.
79. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986).
80. Coal. to Protest Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61,
66-67 (D. Mass. 2004).
81. Id. at 74.
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tailored" 82 and denied an injunction seeking to prohibit the use of what he
admitted conveyed "the symbolic sense of a holding pen where potentially
dangerous persons are separated from others. '83
On appeal, the protestors argued that they did not merely wish to express
their ideas, but to interact face-to-face with delegates. In upholding the
district court's decision, the First Circuit reasoned that, "although the
opportunity to interact directly with the body of delegates by, say, moving
among them and distributing literature, would doubtless have facilitated the
demonstrators' ability to reach their intended audience, there is no
constitutional requirement that demonstrators be granted that sort of
particularized access." 84 Moreover, "messages expressed beyond the first-
hand sight and sound of the delegates nonetheless have a propensity to
reach the delegates through television, radio, the press, the internet, and
other outlets." 85 This view requires that third parties carry the protestors'
message, despite the Supreme Court's holding that third party media outlets
cannot be forced to provide space on their venues for such messages. 86
Notably, the importance of place fails to enter into the analysis at all; when
the First Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in finding that
"viable alternative means existed to enable protesters to communicate their
messages to the delegates," 87 those means were evaluated without regard to
place at all.
The other potential alternative cited by the First Circuit requires print and
electronic media rather than the face-to-face interaction of a physical
place. 88 Just as all media are not the same, not all places for speech are
interchangeable; yet the court refused to recognize that where the
participants speak is as important as what they say. Finally, by ignoring the
particular role of place, as well as the importance of having space within an
existing forum broadly conceived, the court engaged in the following
balancing act: "On the one hand, freedom of expression, especially
freedom of political expression, is vital to the health of our democracy. On
the other hand, making public safety a reality and ensuring that important
political events are able to proceed normally are also valuable. '89 Implicit
in this judicial bromide is the idea that "important political events" can only
"proceed normally" in the absence of any visible dissent. Moreover,
"freedom of political expression," so "vital to the health of our democracy,"
82. Id. at 75.
83. Id. at 74-75.
84. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004).
85. Id.
86. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (holding that a
public television station cannot be required to provide space for a speaker it deemed a
nonviable candidate for a congressional seat); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974) (holding that a newspaper cannot be required to provide space for the expression
of candidates' views).
87. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 14.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 15.
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is not connected at all to normal politics, but is a freedom to be exercised
"over there," invisible and inaudible to the public. At the Democratic
National Convention, government regulation of place succeeded in
suppressing speech. Because the place was so forbidding, no speakers were
willing to go there in order to express their ideas. 90
Zoning the place of speech in this manner has not been uniformly and
absolutely upheld. In 2000, a district court enjoined the City of Los
Angeles from establishing a secured protest zone that was out of the sight
line of delegates attending the 2000 Democratic Convention.91 The court
held that the city's placement of the zone was not narrowly tailored to serve
a legitimate government interest and that the area did not provide adequate
alternative channels of communication. 92 In another small concession to
political speech in the public sphere, another district court issued a
preliminary injunction against New York City for its use of holding "pens"
to contain demonstrators at the 2004 Republican National Convention. 93 In
anticipation of widespread protests, the pens were placed along multiple
city blocks with each holding approximately 4000 people. Once people
were inside the pens, the city generally did not allow them to exit for
bathroom breaks. Also, if the police allowed a person to exit one pen, they
would force the person to enter another pen on her return. The city justified
the use of such pens on safety and security grounds. 94 Although the court
"enjoined [the New York Police Department] from unreasonably restricting
access to and participation in demonstrations through the use of pens," 95 no
particular action was required of the city, and the use of such pens was not
itself questioned. Instead, the court considered only the manner in which
the pens were used.96 Remaining free to construct oppressive architectures
to suppress dissent, city officials needed only to adjust the manner in which
they controlled the use of space in order to control the dissenting speech. 97
There was no need to rethink their manipulation of place in order to control
speech.
In all of these cases and practices, the effect is the suppression of speech
through the supposed content-neutral regulation of place. 98 Although the
90. See Kifner, supra note 9.
91. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 660 v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d
966, 975 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
92. Id.
93. Stauber v. City of New York, 03 Civ. 9162, 03 Civ. 9163, 03 Civ. 9164, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13350 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004).
94. Id. at *4.
95. Id. at *95.
96. Id. at *76-*81.
97. Architectural control of place, and the spaces that constitute a particular place, is an
effective means of asserting state power without appearing to censor speech. Nonetheless,
architecture is a means of control, as Michel Foucault famously argued using the example of
Jeremy Bentham's panopticon. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the
Prison 200 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
98. Even where there is a putative underlying court victory on the behalf of speakers, as
in Stauber, speech is often suppressed in other ways at the sites where persons seek to speak.
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Supreme Court considered the dislocated speech at issue in Renton to be
"low value" speech, the speech dislocated in these more recent cases and
practices is core political speech. Moreover, the very nature of public
appearances aimed at communication is that speakers are able to encounter
other persons with whom they wish to speak. As Harry Kalven aptly puts
the point, "Among the many hallmarks of an open society, surely one must
be that not every group of people on the streets is 'a mob,' and another that
its streets time out of mind have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions." 99
Sterilized public spheres do not allow citizens to encounter each other as
free and autonomous persons capable of exchanging ideas and discussing
the issues of the day.100 If the significance of place does not feature in the
values thought to ground the First Amendment, and if place is doctrinally
relegated to mere content-neutral zoning, then public places may be safe
and secure, though free from speech.
The following part considers the values grounding free speech, and in the
parts that follow, this Article traces the doctrinal failure of the Supreme
Court to consider the importance of place in relation to traditional First
Amendment values.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY
Theory in First Amendment discussion is often taken to provide a "core
value" by which courts and commentators can measure a particular
regulation, prohibition, or limitation of speech and conduct.' 0 ' After
identifying a core value, a court can apply doctrinal analysis to the
particular circumstance to yield a constitutional answer. We might call this
a "doctrinal syllogism." Professor Stanley Fish portrays it as a "two-step"
dance: "The first step was to identify the essence or center of First
Amendment freedoms; the second step was to devise a policy that protected
and honored the center so identified."' 0 2 Questions about the role of theory
have led some, including Fish, to abandon the very idea of achieving a
For example, many protesters were arrested on the streets during the 2004 Republican
National Convention. See Michael Slackman & Diane Cardwell, Police Tactics Mute
Protesters and Messages, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 2004, at Al.
99. Kalven, supra note 57, at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. The problem here is not that persons will separate themselves from other human
beings in an excessive form of individualism. As Cass Sunstein speculates, "Public forums
make it more likely that people will not be able to wall themselves off from their fellow
citizens. People will get a glimpse, at least, of the lives of others, as for example through
encountering people from different social classes." Sunstein, supra note 22, at 33. Rather,
the problem here is that the state may itself wall citizens off from their fellow citizens.
101. Jed Rubenfeld writes, "Giant-sized First Amendment theories tend to start with one
or both of two giant-sized ideas: either democracy or individual autonomy." Jed Rubenfeld,
The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 Yale L.J. 1, 30 (2002).
102. Stanley Fish, The Trouble With Principle 116 (1999).
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single overarching theory to guide First Amendment jurisprudence.103 Fish
has a point; the plethora of theory inevitably leads us back to particular
practices and policies in which the First Amendment is implicated-though
it is always difficult to say what overarching value takes precedent. The
failure to determine what single value underlies the First Amendment does
not, however, entail that the theory is not useful in helping to clarify some
of the underlying issues involved when applying the Free Speech Clause.
Although canvassing all of the potential theories of the First Amendment is
beyond the scope of this Article, it is useful to understand the arguments of
two particular approaches to the First Amendment: autonomy and
democracy.
A. The Value ofAutonomy
Many commentators rely on a conception of autonomy to justify theories
of First Amendment jurisprudence. What gives the First Amendment such
a central place in the public's imagination and in the Court's doctrine is its
presumed connection to basic human autonomy and liberty. 10 4 Answering
to theory and policy, First Amendment jurisprudence should protect the
core moral and political value of autonomous self-expression, quite
irrespective of any desired consequential outcomes. One version of this
approach is found in Martin Redish's advocacy of the one true First
Amendment value of "individual self-realization."' 1 5 This value develops
the individual's powers and ability to control his or her future through
making substantive choices about that future. Democratic values, because
they are merely instances or outgrowths of the one fundamental value of
"self-realization," provide only one way in which those values might be
manifested. 10 6 Other advocates of the libertarian value of self-expression
focus on the individual's right to non-interference, the individual's right to
receive information, and the individual's fundamental right of free
choice. 10 7 These "expressive" theories focus on the need for fully formed
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 573 (1995) (noting "the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment[]
that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message").
105. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 593 (1982).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 979,
998 (1997) ("[L]iberty is a (legal) capacity to make choices about behavior."); Thomas I.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 879 (1963)
("The right to freedom of expression... derives from the widely accepted premise of
Western thought that the proper end of man is the realization of his character and
potentialities as a human being."); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1
Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204, 222 (1972) ("[T]he authority of governments to restrict the liberty of
citizens in order to prevent certain harms does not include authority to prevent these harms
by controlling people's sources of information to insure that they will maintain certain
beliefs."); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 Colum.
L. Rev. 334, 335 (1991) (arguing that freedom of speech is designed to protect autonomy
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autonomous agents to realize their autonomy through public expression of
their ideas. The protection of free expression by the First Amendment is
protection of the important value found in the individual capacity to express
ideas, opinions, and perspectives. If the state suppresses speech, the state
inhibits the self-expression thought to be essential to the exercise of
personal autonomy.
A version of autonomy is often at least the implicit, if not explicit,
justification for the Supreme Court's content-neutrality analysis. Consider
the Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 108 in which the Court struck down
central provisions in campaign finance laws designed to correct imbalances
in the realization of autonomy. The Court noted, "[T]he concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment... ."109 The Court was only concerned about the ability to
identify a separation between individuals, and claim neutrality between
them. "[S]ome elements" are distinct from the "relative voice of others,"
and hence no further inquiry is needed. I 10 The philosophical justification
remains implicit: It would violate the liberty or self-realizing autonomy of
''some" in order to promote the substantive capacities of "others," and such
violation of procedural autonomy is never warranted, no matter the
substantive inequities that might result. "Wholly foreign" goes beyond
epistemic notions of warrant to suggest that it cannot even be recognized as
the relevant kind of reason at all; one might as well be advocating
gobbledygook.
Quite divorced from democratic ideals, the expressive value of speech as
an end in itself leads to clashes of expression. Racist speech is notorious
for producing such conflicts."' The autonomy of those expressing racist
viewpoints stands in opposition to their targets' desire to avoid the harm in
being subject to that expression. The harm for the autonomy of the target is
in the denigration of her self-conceptions and the opportunity to foster her
own self-expression. 1 2 However, if, for instance, campus speech codes are
enacted to prohibit racist speech on campus, the individual who wishes to
express her disfavored views now has her autonomy and right of self-
expression suppressed. 1 3 This opposition arises most notoriously when a
and that "the government may not suppress speech on the ground that the speech is likely to
persuade people to do something that the government considers harmful").
108. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
109. Id. at 48-49.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black (Black I1), 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Robert C. Post, Racist
Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 267, 312-17 (1991).
112. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431; Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989).
113. Arguing against such codes and for the fundamental value of self-expression, Baker
suggests, "The speaker typically views her own expression as a manifestation of autonomy;
the speech presents or embodies her values." Baker, supra note 107, at 990; see also Nadine
Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 Duke L.J. 484.
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Ku Klux Klan member wishes to express solidarity with fellow bigoted
travelers by imposing harm on others through acts of self- and group-
expression.
To preserve the value of self-expression in First Amendment disputes, a
court must vigilantly protect autonomy against the power of the state to
censor, up to a limit when the harm turns from denigration to intimidation.
The Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black balanced the self-expression rights
of the Klan against the harm of intimidation suffered by the targets of that
speech."14  This case was somewhat surprising. The Virginia Supreme
Court had treated the cross-burning statute as clearly analogous to the St.
Paul, Minnesota, ordinance struck down in R.A. V. v. St. Paul.1 l5 Yet, the
U.S. Supreme Court was willing to weigh the value of self-expression
against the harm of intimidation created by the acts of putative self-
expression. 116
The central ideal of autonomy is that there is a core self that manifests its
preexisting autonomy through speech. Any interference with speech is thus
interference with the exercise of autonomy. Because autonomy is a
fundamental value of liberty, "17 state intrusion on autonomy can seldom, if
ever, be justified on democratic principles. There are two versions of
arguments for autonomy as a fundamental value: (1) arguments that reduce
all other values to the value of self-expression, deriving some ontological
priority of the self antecedent to the self s social and political
commitments;"18 and (2) arguments for protecting autonomy as the only
way to protect and further deliberative democracy because there is no
principled way to violate the autonomy of some to promote that of
others. "19
Richard Fallon makes a perceptive and useful distinction within
autonomy between what he calls descriptive autonomy and ascriptive
114. The Court provided a lengthy history of the Klan's use of cross burning to establish
the contextual meaning of the intimidation and harm caused by cross burning. By contrast,
the Court recognized the possibility of a purely expressive use of cross burning that is
protected. The Court wrote, "[W]hile a burning cross does not inevitably convey a message
of intimidation, often the cross burner intends that the recipients of the message fear for their
lives. And when a cross burning is used to intimidate, few if any messages are more
powerful." Black II, 538 U.S. at 357. Moreover, when cross-burning is used to intimidate, it
is no longer self-expression, but a proscribable threat.
115. Black v. Commonwealth (Black 1), 553 S.E.2d 738, 742-44 (Va. 2001) (citing
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)).
116. Black I, 538 U.S. at 362-63.
117. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) ("Liberty presumes an autonomy
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.").
118. See Baker, supra note 107, at 992 ("Respect for personhood, for agency, or for
autonomy, requires that each person must be permitted to be herself and to present herself.");
Redish, supra note 105.
119. Robert Post, Managing Deliberation: The Quandary of Democratic Dialogue, 103
Ethics 654, 672 (1993) ("Citizenship thus presupposes the attribution of freedom. The
ascription of autonomy is in this sense the transcendental precondition for the possibility of
democratic self-determination.").
2604 [Vol. 75
DISPLACING DISSENT
autonomy. 120 Descriptive autonomy captures the ways persons possess
critical and self-critical ability, competence to act, sufficient options to
exercise our capacity to act, and independence from coercion and
manipulation. These features of our autonomy can exist to a greater or
lesser extent, and their existence suggests the possibility for the
development of a greater degree of autonomy. 2' By contrast, ascriptive
autonomy captures the metaphysical sovereignty we each possess over our
personhood. Ascriptive autonomy is an absolute. 122  The problem, as
Fallon argues, is that descriptive and ascriptive autonomy frequently pull in
opposite directions, resulting in a severe analytical limit on the usefulness
of autonomy as a First Amendment value. 123 In the end, Fallon doubts that
autonomy, as a First Amendment value, "sharply clarifies many ongoing
debates or yields clear prescriptions for many disputed issues."'124
Accordingly, the value of autonomy, as a matter of jurisprudential theory,
may not, in the end, amount to much when addressing particular First
Amendment disputes.
The failure of autonomy theory to clarify the issues faced by policies
such as "protest zones" could not be clearer. In itself, neither descriptive
nor ascriptive autonomy is threatened by dissent being expressed in
cordoned-off areas out of sight of the President or other attendees to
presidential events. Somewhat cynically, one might argue that the self-
expressive value of free speech is being satisfied. The protestors are
allowed to voice their dissent, and even to do so in "public." They are
merely denied their chosen forum and restricted in their access to a desired
audience-features not in themselves guaranteed by the First Amendment.
This discussion suggests that there are two additional conceptions of
autonomy at play. Both Fallon's ascriptive and descriptive notions of
autonomy are examples of what I call "procedural autonomy." Procedural
autonomy considers the individual to be a functional placeholder for such
values as freedom of choice, personal self-determination, self-realization,
liberty, or self-identification. "Substantive autonomy," on the other hand,
points to the value of speech in promoting collective self-determination and
speaks to the qualitative aspects that go into creating the individual identity
of a human being, qua human being, capable of encountering other humans
120. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses ofAutonomy, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 875 (1994).
121. Id. at 880-90.
122. Id. at 890-93.
123. Id. at 893-901. Even worse, autonomy is also conceptually implicated in the
division between negative and positive conceptions of liberty. Versions of negative liberty
stress noninterference with the actions of an autonomous agent by a political body, whereas
versions of positive liberty are concerned with enabling autonomous agents to realize their
freedom through actions fostered by particular kinds of political arrangements. See, e.g.,
Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (1970); Charles Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative
Liberty?, in 2 Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 211, 213 (1985)
(distinguishing freedom as an "exercise-concept" in which one determines for oneself the
shape of one's life and freedom as an "opportunity-concept" in which we are permitted to act
irrespective of the existence of enabling conditions).
124. Fallon, supra note 120, at 902.
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in public space. The former does not concern itself with the capabilities,
capacities, and potentialities for the realization of the individual human
being through engagement with other human beings; it treats autonomy as
something that is antecedent to encountering other persons in public space.
In this sense, public place is merely the location for self-expression. The
latter eschews the possibility of realizing a fully formed autonomous human
life because self is only developed through interaction with other human
beings. Here, public place is essential for encountering others and,
therefore, developing a sense of self. Substantive autonomy is associated
with the value of public deliberation, the second "grand theory"
fundamental free speech value.
B. The Value of Deliberation and Collective Self-determination
Although the value of autonomy features prominently in First
Amendment scholarship, many argue that the core aim of the First
Amendment is not to protect autonomy itself, but to protect political speech
to further the democratic value of collective self-determination. This
approach takes its judicial nod from Justice Brennan, who wrote for the
Court in Garrison v. Louisiana that "speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government."' 125 The
most virulent form of this approach, as advocated by Robert Bork, calls for
the protection of speech only to the extent that it promotes political
autonomy, which is limited to choices related to matters of government
policy, behavior, and personnel.' 26 Professors Harry Kalven and Alexander
Meiklejohn have famously advocated less strained accounts of the First
Amendment value of promoting political speech.127 In order to exercise our
right to self-governance, we need to engage in public discussions about
public issues understood broadly. To the extent that autonomy is protected
on such accounts, it is protected as an instrumental value only insofar as it
furthers democratic self-determination. Genuine choice requires
information, and, thus, speech is protected in order to enable informed
choice.
As a prominent critic of pure autonomy theories, Professor Owen Fiss
explains how such theories are insufficient when compared with those that
advocate some version of protecting public exchange. 128 One problem is
that, in a society with unequal distributions of social goods, protecting
autonomy will promote a debate that reflects the structure of the status quo;
this will tend to skew debate to reflect dominant interests. If "neutral"
125. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
126. Robert H. Bork, Neutral. Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.
L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971).
127. See generally Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-
Government (1948); Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191.
128. See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 786 (1987) [hereinafter
Fiss, Why the State?]; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech (1996).
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principles promote only the existing structure, then we will not have robust
and pluralistic public debate. To counter this limitation of the libertarian
autonomy model, Fiss promotes the "public debate principle" as an
alternative. The public debate principle requires government officials to
examine the quality of the public debate and intervene in the "market" to
ensure an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"'129 discussion of all public
issues. 130
A fundamental debate thus rages between two First Amendment values:
autonomy and the "public debate principle." One benefit of protecting
autonomy is to achieve the political and moral ideal of collective self-
determination. Cass Sunstein and Owen Fiss deny that protecting
autonomy alone is sufficient to achieve collective self-determination;
instead, they advocate for the value of protecting "public debate" or
deliberative democracy.13' These latter values involve an active role for the
state in positively promoting, not merely negatively protecting, speech for
speakers and listeners alike. As Sunstein notes, "One goal of a democracy,
in short, is to ensure autonomy not merely in the satisfaction of preferences,
but also, and more fundamentally, in the processes of preference
formation."' 132 Active intervention in the "marketplace of ideas" in ways
that may affect autonomy can only be an anathema to advocates of the
theory that the First Amendment works to protect autonomy.
Because, in this view, deliberation, not mere self-expression, is the core
value of the First Amendment, there is a need for the government and
courts to protect processes of collective self-determination. The very idea
of determination requires goal-oriented decision making that constitutes
reflective, considered judgments weighing all available information and
perspectives. 133  Of course, the idea of determination will always be
something of a regulative idea. Humans lack both sufficient access to
information and the time and attention necessary to digest the full rahge of
available perspectives and considerations. Determination can never itself
be a rail, extending our decisions automatically before us.134
129. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
130. Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 128, at 785-87.
131. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (1995);
Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 Yale L.J. 2087 (1991).
132. Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 12 (1991).
133. This position is far from controversial within First Amendment Theory. For
example, Robert Post sees autonomy, not as mutually entailing, but as a limit to collective
self-determination: "[T]he concept of autonomy must function within public discourse as a
moral ascription that marks the boundaries of our commitment to democratic self-
government." Post, supra note 119, at 673; see also Fiss, supra note 28, at 1410; Post, supra
note 28, at 1523.
134. The concept of procedural autonomy seems to entail that self-determination is
something that is done by the self prior to engaging with others. Thus if we know the self,
all is already determined. This idea has an analogue to a view of rule following that
Wittgenstein rejects: "If we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement, seems
to be already completely determined." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §
193 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958).
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Determination, rather, always includes the possibility of something new-
the possibility of interrupting the expected.
The focus on collective self-determination underscores the need for
autonomy to promote deliberation. The central value is interpersonal
deliberation. But, for this theory, there are no substantive commitments to
how that deliberation is managed or where it takes place. Deliberation need
not occur in public fora. Thus, we see that neither theory-autonomy nor
deliberation-protects the importance of place. It is as if expression or
deliberation were completely detached abstractions. Perhaps the very idea
of deliberation would seem to entail a robust conception of the role of place.
But deliberation can occur in many forms, such as over the Internet, and
dissent, as recent Secret Service policy attests, can be silenced or removed
to a remote place.
Thus, to develop ways of thinking that enhance the role of place in First
Amendment theory and policy, we must look to fresh insight. Though, with
Stanley Fish, I do not want to suggest that we need a "two-step" theory or
what I call a "doctrinal syllogism."'1 35 Recall that one step is to identify the
core First Amendment value, and the second is to advocate policy to further
that value. 136 By recognizing the importance of substantive autonomy or
democratic deliberation, we will not necessarily be able to engineer specific
outcomes in concrete free speech cases. There is a difference between
positing a core value for free speech from which we can deduce specific
doctrine, and developing values that "We the People" want to see furthered
through our agreement on the important constitutional principle of free
speech. We articulate and defend particular free speech values in order to
shape judicial vision and practice and to give direction and location to
shared social practices and forms of social structure. 137 It is in service of
this latter method that we look to the political theory of Hannah Arendt.
Arendt, in contrast to the approaches canvassed so far, connects both the
very possibility for the formation and appearance of autonomous selves and
the role of public deliberation to the need for place. Although critics and
courts have tended not to view the First Amendment values of autonomy
and deliberative democracy as fundamentally connected to notions of place,
Arendt suggests otherwise. We now turn to her emphasis on the place
where the political may become visible in public space and place.
135. Additional criticisms of the role of theory are found in Stanley Fish, Theory
Minimalism, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 761, 775-76 (2000). Fish defines theory as "an abstract
or algorithmic formulation that guides or governs practice from a position outside any
particular conception of practice." Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change,
Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies 378 (1989).
136. Fish, supra note 102, at 116.
137. See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1249,
1255 (1995) (noting that speech occurs in "the social contexts that envelop and give
constitutional significance to acts of communication").
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III. THE APPEARANCE OF AUTONOMY: HANNAH ARENDT AND THE PLACE
OF SPEECH
Many writers who focus implicitly on autonomy and self-determination
do not directly employ these concepts. 138 For example, Professors Harry
Frankfurt and Charles Taylor both develop accounts of the role of second-
order reflection on the desires and choices one makes. 139 Though neither
employs the concept of autonomy, both capture an important component of
autonomy: the necessity of exercising our reflective capacity to accept or
reject ideas, opinions, and projects.140 For our purposes, such reflective
capacity is important to the political realm because, without access to
engagement with and exchange of ideas, the material about which one
might exercise that capacity is limited, and so too is the development of
personal autonomy. Hannah Arendt's political theory provides an
important way for the free speech tradition to understand the possibility for
a full reflective human life lived in public engagement with others. 141 This
possibility is inherently tied to the need for place.
A. The Place ofAppearances
Hannah Arendt, in response to the terror of totalitarianism and the
emergence of new forms of evil found in the apparent everyday world of
rather ordinary bureaucrats, is most concerned with understanding and
protecting the world of appearances. 142 For Arendt, in opposition to the
philosophical tradition of Plato, the real world is the world in which things
appear, not the hidden world of reality underlying appearances. To discern
the supposed "real" world, one needs special, philosophical analysis,
whereas to understand the world of appearances one needs only freedom to
act and react. The world of appearances is the world in which human
actions occur, and "action" in Arendt's particular meaning creates the
shared political world we inhabit with fellow human beings. 143 Action is
138. And still others, such as Joel Feinberg, conclude that the concept lacks a coherent,
unified meaning. Joel Feinberg, 3 The Moral Limb of the Criminal Law, Harm to Self
(1986). See generally John Christman, Constructing the Inner Citadel: Recent Work on the
Concept ofAutonomy, 99 Ethics 109 (1988).
139. See Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person, 68 J. Phil.
5 (1971); Charles Taylor, Responsibility for Self, in The Identities of Persons 281 (Am~lie
Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1976).
140. The central idea here is that autonomy is bound up with making beliefs, in a sense,
'mine." I argue that beliefs can be "mine" in a relevant and meaningful sense only if they
are the product of public engagement with others.
141. Kant tied enlightenment to the "freedom to make public use of one's reason in all
matters." Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, reprinted in
Political Writings 54, 55 (Hans Reiss ed., 2d ed. 1991).
142. See Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought
(1977) [hereinafter Arendt, Between Past and Future]; Hannah Arendt, The Human
Condition (1958) [hereinafter Arendt, The Human Condition]; Hannah Arendt, The Origins
of Totalitarianism (New ed. 1973). See generally John McGowan, Hannah Arendt: An
Introduction (1998).
143. Arendt, The Human Condition, supra note 142, at 175-88.
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what reveals human identity, an identity that is not fully formed prior to
one's acting. The capacity for spontaneity means that a person's identity is
always in the process of developing in its disclosure before other human
beings. "This disclosure of 'who' in contradistinction to 'what' somebody
is... is implicit in everything somebody says and does."' 144  Arendt
eschews the need to provide an account of anything so rigid as "human
nature." Instead, she develops an account of the "human condition," which
is determined through human interaction in and with a shared world. Part
of this shared world is the human condition of "natality"-the capacity to
initiate something new in the world through action. Furthermore, "[i]n this
sense of initiative, an element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent
in all human activities."145 Acting is setting something in motion, and this
is always the beginning of something new that has not yet appeared before
in the world.
The condition of natality means that the shared human world constituting
our human condition need never be static.1 46 The possibility of something
new appearing through human creativity prevents the future from being
fully determined by the past. Arendt's discussion of the condition of human
autonomy manifests important philosophical underpinnings for the free
speech doctrine and for the place speech occupies in actualizing human
identity. Speech is a vital form of action necessary for not only disclosing
human identity, but also for creating the shared political world. It is not just
that humans reveal that they are distinct from each other, but that "[s]peech
and action reveal this unique distinctness."' 147 Indeed,
[a]ction and speech are so closely related because the primordial and
specifically human act must at the same time contain the answer to the
question asked of every newcomer: 'Who are you?' This disclosure of
who somebody is, is implicit in both his words and his deeds ....
Speechless action would no longer be action because there would no
longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if he
is at the same time the speaker of words. 148
Speech thus is of fundamental philosophical importance because it
constitutes a necessary condition for the development of human identity.
This development comes about only in the world of appearances, where we
are revealed to others such that speech becomes necessarily dialogic.
In the exchange of speech, in the presence of ours and other persons'
actions, we become fully human. Thus, philosophically speaking, free
speech is vital not just to a collective political world (which it certainly is)
but also for each person's development and disclosure of his or her identity.
Free speech has a special place in constitutional jurisprudence because
144. Id. at 179.
145. Id. at 9.
146. Id. at 7-11.
147. Id. at 176.
148. Id. at 178-79.
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speech plays a central role in personal identity. 149 The disclosure of
personal identity is not, to repeat, a matter of esoteric and individual
interest, but is of interest to all, for in that disclosure a shared political
world is created and fostered. Advocates of autonomy in the libertarian
tradition wish to make a distinction between a fully formed antecedent
human identity who appears before and retrenches from the public, political
world. Arendt provides a compelling, alternative account of the
impossibility of making that distinction--of driving a wedge between
personal and political identity.
For humans to disclose and create their identity, there must exist a public
space for appearing for oneself and to others. Arendt claims that the
"public" denotes two related phenomena: "It means, first, that everything
that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the
widest possible publicity. For us, appearance ... constitutes reality."'150
Second, "the term 'public' signifies the world itself, in so far as it is
common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in
it."15 1  The human condition is one of plurality in which each person
inhabits a world with many other persons, and "this plurality is specifically
the condition... of all political life." 152 But there is no world independent
of the appearance of those persons in creating the condition of political life.
Because a robust existence of the political world depends on the plurality of
perspectives, "[t]he end of the common world has come when it is seen
only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one
perspective."' 153 This idea-that the common world constitutes the world of
appearances wherein individuals create their identities-is central to
understanding how both autonomy and deliberative democracy depend
upon the role of place. It is not just the quality of public debate that is at
issue, but the very reality of anything appearing as public, political debate
where different persons can see, hear, and speak to other persons. This
reality is necessarily dialogic, depending on multiple perspectives and
appearing in multiple aspects. Arendt notes that "the reality of the public
realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives."' 154
Like the events of the twentieth century to which she is responding,
Arendt argues against the negative liberty tradition that considers rights and
autonomy as necessarily prior to and separate from the engaged world of
political appearance. 155 Arendt's thoughts not only provide an alternative
conception of autonomy, but also call attention to the role of serendipity
and public encounters that might interrupt settled patterns of political life in
149. To put the point in Alasdair Maclntyre's terms, "[M]an is in his actions and practice,
as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal." Alasdair Maclntyre, After
Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 201 (1981).
150. Arendt, The Human Condition, supra note 142, at 50.
151. Id. at 52.
152. Id. at 7.
153. Id. at 58.
154. Id. at 57.
155. See Arendt, Between Past and Future, supra note 142, at 143-71.
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positive ways. First, Arendt argues that the idea of individual freedom in
the inner life of the will-a concept necessary for the libertarian account of
individual identity existing prior to political life-cannot adequately
account for freedom. 156 If freedom is so self-contained, then it would be
entirely consistent with tyranny because freedom would be analytically
independent of the "outward" modes of political existence. Second,
tyranny, Arendt argues, is inconsistent with freedom precis'ely because the
appearance of human freedom conceptually and analytically requires a
public space of appearance. 157 In this space, the historical, the traditional,
the natural, and the automatic are all "constantly interrupted by human
initiative." 158 For Arendt, freedom is what emerges from human action in
public space and is not something reserved to the private "inner" realm of
consciousness formed in isolation from the common linguistic and political
world. Thus, in order to protect human freedom, we must protect the
capacity for human action to appear as something new in the world. We
must protect the process of interrupting settled patterns of a shared political
life, lest we risk stagnating into freedom-stifling social structures.
In order to achieve this end of protecting the possibility of human
freedom as an expression of human identity through speech and action,
First Amendment jurisprudence must foster spaces and places for such
appearances. The issue of space is contained in the Court's media access
decisions which have stumbled along primarily in reliance on two general
principles: (1) that regulation of speech must be content-neutral; and (2)
that maintaining supposed "neutral" markets for speech-a kind of
negative, laissez faire, approach to regulation-is sufficient to protect
speech from abridgement. The issue of place is found in the Court's
"public forum" analysis, particularly regarding the public role of privately
owned shopping centers and airports. I shall discuss each issue in turn.
B. The Language of Dissent
Language itself is often a source of controversy. The ability to make
meaning is the ability to create and define social and political reality. 159 In
the 1990s, Americans debated over the language of "political correctness."
The controversy was over who gets to control the meanings of words.
Americans also disagree on the use of marked language to construct gender
difference. 160 People also dispute whole narratives such as the 0. J.
Simpson trial and verdict. These controversies over uses of language define
individual perspectives, and define common cultural experience. One
reason the "political correctness" cacophony resonated so fiercely on both
156. Id. at 146-49.
157. Id. at 170.
158. Id.
159. See generally Robin Tolmach Lakoff, The Language War (2000).
160. See id.
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the left and right is that it made manifest the notion that the one who could
control meaning could control social and political reality.
To use broad political generalizations, both the political right, which
opposed campus regulations of hate speech and other trappings of "political
correctness" on First Amendment grounds, and the political left, which
supported such speech regulations on Fourteenth Amendment grounds,
seemed to agree on the proposition that meaning matters. And meaning
matters precisely because the ability to control language is the ability to
control aspects of reality. Both sides of the debate implicitly accepted that
meaning is a product of social practices. Only if a change in words and
meaning could change practices and perceptions would any party to the
debate bother to holler so loudly.
What is the source of this thought that meanings are connected to
practices in such a way as to play a constitutive role in human life?
Commentators have focused on the role of ordinary language since the
writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein on the topic in the first half of the
twentieth century. Relevant to the purposes of this Article, Wittgenstein
introduces the idea of a language game to focus the connection between
speech and action: "Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or
of a form of life.' 161 "Form of life" is a technical term meant to convey the
multiplicity of both possible ways of living and possible ways of seeing and
responding to the world. The ability to speak a language is the ability to
engage in practices within a form of life in which that language has
meaning. To speak is to have a perspective on the world, to master how to
follow the rules within a practice, or to be open to new ways of seeing the
world through encounters with the perspectives of other persons. Speech
matters because it is through language that we construct a world through
our interactions and cooperative practices with other human beings with
whom we share this "complicated form of life."' 162 Indeed, agreement in
practices is necessary for language to have meaning: "If language is to be a
means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions
but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments."'163 Agreement in use of
language is the common calculus by which we are able to understand each
other and to coordinate our lives, and such agreement suggests that a robust
exemplification of a form of life is what occurs in public space. Because of
the very public nature of meaning, public use and control of language is
highly contentious.
To restrict speech, according to Arendt, is to restrict human practice, to
diminish a form of life. Language and speech particularly matter to our
form of life because it is in and through them that we engage the world and
other human beings. The loss of language can occasion the loss of a
161. Wittgenstein, supra note 134, § 23.
162. Id. § i.
163. Id. § 242.
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perspective of the world. Language works to create shared meaning, and in
so doing, to construct human practices and perceptions. 164 Language also
shapes how we respond to other human beings, actions, events, and things
in the world. For example, the fight over political correctness or the
recognition of the harms of racist speech highlight the profound importance
of speech in creating a shared world.' 65 Although it is beyond the scope of
this Article to defend the philosophical accuracy of Wittgenstein's ordinary
language philosophy, his account of language does provide widely accepted
reasons to think that language matters to everyday life-not only because
language is a means of communication, but also because it is a way of
constituting identity and social relations. If there were not a shared
recognition of this latter assertion, language would not engender such
debate.
By shunting dissent off to the disappearing margins of society, there is an
implicit recognition of the power of language. When citizens brandishing
signs with messages such as "Cheney-19th C. Energy Man," 166 "Welcome
Governor Bush," 167 or "Instead of War Invest in People"'168 are shunted off
to "protest zones," there is not only an issue of place, but of language. Such
slogans do not obviously have the meaning of protest. Nor does wearing a
shirt that says "Give Peace a Chance"' 69 or even carrying a jacket that says
"Fuck the Draft."' 170 To categorize such language as dissent or as protest is
already an attempt to control it, to say this language is "in protest," and not
merely "in communication." Such language is just as easily an expression
of group solidarity as it is a protest against another group. Labeling
language as "protest" or "dissent" is an attempt to control its meaning and
how it will be read.
Dissent opens up the possibility of change and challenges existing
conceptions. As such, it is a particularly vulnerable characterization of
speech, precisely because it does not appear as the ordinary and everyday.
Once speech is labeled as "dissent," why would "We the People" wish to
protect it? John Stuart Mill lamented the loss of dissent, because, by
suppressing dissenting opinions, we "are deprived of the opportunity of
exchanging error for truth."' 171 Following in the Millian tradition, Cass
164. While Wittgenstein is not alone in developing this thought, he is perhaps the most
significant twentieth century source. More recent developments of Wittgenstein's thought
can be found in Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality
and Tragedy (1979); Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); Richard Rorty,
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989) [hereinafter Rorty, Contingency]; see also J.L.
Austin, How to Do Things with Words (1962).
165. Lawrence, supra note 112; Post, supra note 111, at 312-17.
166. ACLU, supra note 70, at 13.
167. Your Right to Say It, supra note 73.
168. ACLU, supra note 70, at 11.
169. Id. at7.
170. The right to wear this famous message was upheld in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15(1971).
171. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), reprinted in On Liberty and Other Writings 1,
20 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989).
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Sunstein has recently argued that, as a society, we should protect dissent
because it has important informational capacity: "[D]issent can be an
important corrective" 172 to ensure that the "public is [not] deprived of
information it might need." 173 Through analyzing experiments by Solomon
Asch, Stanley Milgram, and others on the social phenomena of conformity,
cascades, and group polarization, Sunstein argues for the deliberative role
of free speech, the need for diversity in the federal judiciary, the need for
limited affirmative action, and the general social need for openness.174 He
argues that dissent is "principally valuable as a way of improving
decisions." 175 He concludes that "[o]rganizations and nations are far more
likely to prosper if they welcome dissent and promote openness."'176
Dissent, however, is more than avoiding costs and improving
informational accuracy. 177 Dissent is about changing the topic, creating a
new vocabulary, 178 and providing a new way of seeing. 179 Dissent is also
about making visible the existence of minorities who hold different
views. 180 When engaged in the process of merely improving the flow of
information for purposes of decisional accuracy, one never has to question
the practices and purposes about which one must make a decision.
Dissent-the dissent of Arendt's Human Condition-calls for something
more: an openness and a seeking after something entirely new.
Hannah Arendt's thought has given us a purchase on both the role of
place and the interruptive role of language in making visible both
autonomous persons and the political community. Even if language is
controlled as dissent or protest, it must nonetheless make an appearance in a
public space, not in an isolated zone. If we fashion First Amendment policy
and practice to undermine the place of speech, we will have forever lost the
opportunity to inhabit collectively a truly shared public sphere. Maybe
some would consider that a suitable bargain for obtaining other forms of
security. But the values of autonomy and collective self-determination
suggest a need for a developed "policy of place" in First Amendment
jurisprudence.
172. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent 93 (2003).
173. Id. at 110.
174. See id. at 14-38.
175. Id. at 89.
176. Id. at 210-11.
177. Dissent is also about combating injustice when the status quo promotes injustices.
See Shiffrin, Dissent, supra note 1.
178. Richard Rorty argues that we replace outworn vocabularies with new ways of
speaking, and that with new ways of speaking we create new ways of inhabiting social
space. See Rorty, Contingency, supra note 164.
179. Irving Howe founded the journal Dissent in 1954 out of a similar desire to create a
forum to bring new ideas into the public sphere. See Irving Howe, This Age of Conformity, in
A World More Attractive: A View of Modem Literature and Politics 251 (Irving Howe ed.,
1963).
180. As Heather Gerken observes, "In order for dissent to function in the manner Mill
envisioned, it must be visible. If would-be dissenters keep their views to themselves, their
ideas will never reach the marketplace of ideas." Gerken, supra note 1, at 1760.
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IV. PLACE AND FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
The previous sections have shown that two alternative "grand theories"
of the core First Amendment value-autonomy and deliberation-both fail
to accord a proper role for the place of free speech in theory or policy.
Place here can be ambiguous, meaning either a place in conceptual
understanding or simply a physical place. As Arendt's thought
demonstrates, both are implicated. But, how does this understanding of the
need for a policy of place affect First Amendment doctrine? How can we
put this understanding of place to work in understanding First Amendment
jurisprudence-both past and future?
The following sections sketch some applications for a policy that gives
due regard to the need for a place in First Amendment practice and
jurisprudence. My thesis is not that doctrinal answers to First Amendment
issues can simply be "read" off the theoretical framework I have presented
here. Rather, since the doctrinal turn asks about the status of place prior to
determining whether the speech should be protected, there is some doctrinal
truth to the notion of "pride of place."
A. Speech in Space
The Supreme Court's reliance on "content-neutral," "marketplace of
ideas" analysis misses the mark when it comes to protecting individual
autonomy and fostering deliberative democracy. This reliance would,
under the guise of avoiding state censorship of any particular idea or
message, permit a world in which there are no alternative messages or ideas
to censor. 181 Content-neutrality provides no analytic point of entry into an
impoverished "world" that exists quite apart from explicit and directed
"state action" in which multiple perspectives cease to exist and the "world"
presents itself under only one aspect. 182
Space provides access to a given forum occupied by others; place
provides the location. Even where a place for speech exists, there is no
guarantee of broader access for those wishing to speak in that place. 183
Where a place exists, there is a problem of space. Space, no less than place,
figures prominently in our philosophical tradition as a necessary condition
not only for human experience, 184 but also for human practice-practice
181. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 296 (1992)
("[Clourts should attend to the possibility that seemingly neutral restrictions will have
content-based effects.").
182. But see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Win. &
Mary L. Rev. 189 (1983) (developing the distinction between content neutral and content
based regulation as a valuable analytic distinction).
183. Michel de Certeau comments that "space is a practiced place." Michel de Certeau,
The Practice of Everyday Life 117 (1984). For de Certeau, a practiced place is a place
defined by the practices that give it shape through their use as place.
184. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Norman Kemp Smith trans.,
MacMillan and Co. 1950) (1929) (arguing that space and time are necessary conditions for
the possibility of all experience).
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that importantly includes discussion and deliberation.185 As Merleau-Ponty
emphasizes, "[S]pace is not the setting (real or logical) in which things are
arranged, but the means whereby the positing of things becomes
possible."186
One problem is that there is no antitrust law for the First Amendment. 187
The Court has recognized the problem of a potential monopoly in its never
repeated virtuoso performance in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: 188 "It
is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee."' 189 Red Lion upheld the "fairness
doctrine" promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission
requiring broadcasters to provide information on matters of public concern
and to give opportunities for each side of an issue to be heard. 190 What is
significant about the Court's opinion is that it recognizes (1) that the
structure of the "market" for expressing ideas on the airwaves is itself
created by law; and (2) that the marketplace, left to its own devices, does
not necessarily foster First Amendment values by providing access to
"social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which
[are] crucial"' 191 to our ability to appear before and create a common
political world (to put the point in Arendt's language). The disappearance
of plurality and multiple perspectives diminishes the world both politically
and ethically. 192 Difference enables a plurality of human identities to
appear and provides the tools necessary for individuals to think and act.193
For this Article's purposes, reliance on content-neutral First Amendment
analysis withholds the tools necessary to confront a "world" where politics
as the space for the appearance of plurality is denied.
185. For example, Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin are careful not only to consider
what physical spaces public deliberation over electoral candidates might occupy, but also to
consider what space on private and public schedules would be necessary. They conclude
that space for deliberation can be created by the addition of a national holiday-Deliberation
Day. Bruce Ackerman & James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day (2004).
186. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 243 (Colin Smith trans., 1962).
187. However, the Court did find that antitrust considerations were a sufficient state
interest to overcome a First Amendment challenge to the "must carry" provision of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
188. 395 U.S. 367, 90 (1969).
189. Id. at 390.
190. Id. at 396. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First
Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C. L. Rev. 539 (1978).
191. RedLion 395 U.S. at 390.
192. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press: A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 1641, 1644-47 (1967) (noting the failure of mass media to present a diversity of ideas).
193. By attempting to destroy all forms of open human interaction, "totalitarian
domination tried to establish... holes of oblivion into which all deeds, good and evil, would
disappear." See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil
232 (Penguin Books 2006) (1963).
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The Court's opinion in Red Lion, it seems, was a single aberration within
the free speech tradition. The Court appears to have abandoned the
doctrine, as evidenced by its ruling in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo.194 There, the Court struck down a Florida "right of reply" statute
that required newspapers to provide rebuttal space for any personally
assailed candidate. The Court reasoned that the regulation enacted a
penalty on the basis of content by requiring a newspaper to include specific
content to the exclusion of alternative content (due to conditions of
scarcity). 195 Citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court further noted
that the regulation "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
debate,"'196 forcing editors to act as self-censors while impermissibly
intruding on the "function of editors."'197
The Court stepped away from its proactive approach to the structure of
the marketplace during the five years between Red Lion and Miami Herald.
One stop along the way exemplifies this trend. Writing for a bare majority
in CBS v. Democratic National Committee, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
refused to uphold requirements that broadcasters allow responsible groups
to purchase advertising time to air public issues. 198 Chief Justice Burger
used the language of both Meiklejohn and the marketplace to reach a
different conclusion than it might seem either would require.' 99  He
inverted the structural concern and the reasoning used to justify the
"fairness doctrine," claiming that it is not important that everyone get to
speak. Rather than reading the "fairness doctrine" at issue to provide more
egalitarian and open access for groups to air issues, Chief Justice Burger
concluded, "The Commission was justified in concluding that the public
interest in providing access to the marketplace of 'ideas and experiences'
would scarcely be served by a system so heavily weighted in favor of the
financially affluent, or those with access to wealth. ' 200 Chief Justice
Burger reasoned that, if one upholds this use of the "fairness doctrine," the
wealthy will be able to determine what issues get heard, thereby
undermining the broadcasters' editorial discretion. 201  The "fairness
doctrine" itself argues that, absent marketplace intervention on behalf of
those who do not own access to mass media, only the "financially affluent"
will be heard. Chief Justice Burger implied that, in this regulatory vacuum,
monied interests will volunteer to share their space.
Thus, in both CBS and Miami Herald, the Court refused to engage its
own deviation from its more laissez faire, free speech analysis. Indeed, in
CBS, the Court went so far as to invert the structural analysis to achieve the
194. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (failing to cite Red Lion).
195. Id. at 256.
196. Id. at 257 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
197. Id. at 258.
198. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 94-95 (1973).
199. Id. at 122-23.
200. Id. at 123.
201. Id.
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same result as a content-neutral analysis. From the perspective of an
expressive theory, or procedural autonomy, this is acceptable, because we
cannot "silence" one speaker to make room for many others. Yet more is
required if one is genuinely concerned about the substantive autonomy of
speakers and listeners. The Court must protect the possibility of
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 202 speech by protecting the structures
of collective self-determination that enable the appearance of substantive
autonomy (which, in turn, is necessary for robust collective self-
determination).
Yet Red Lion lives on in dissenting and concurring opinions, much as the
call for protecting democratic deliberation and the "free trade in ideas"
lived in the dissents of Justices Holmes and Louis Brandeis. 203 In Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court upheld a "must-carry"
provision that required cable operators to carry local broadcasting stations
as part of their "package" of cable programming. 2°4 The worry was that the
cable operators could wield too much market power and refuse to carry
local programming in lieu of programming by cable-only companies.
Since, at the time of the holding, approximately sixty percent of U.S.
households received cable programming (a percentage that has only
increased over time), the possibility to undermine the availability of
broadcast programming to non-cable households was real. The majority
opinion by Justice Kennedy reasoned that the "must carry" provision of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992205 is
content-neutral, and, under the lower scrutiny employed for content-neutral
regulation, the Court determined that the regulation did not violate the First
Amendment.206 Here, the analysis proceeded by testing the regulation
under intermediate scrutiny to see whether the regulation furthered
important governmental interests and whether the regulation burdened more
speech than necessary to further those interests. 207 The dissent argued that,
because the regulation was based on content, it would have applied strict
scrutiny and concluded that the provision was unconstitutional. 20 8
In determining that the "must-carry" provision survives intermediate
scrutiny, Justice Kennedy did not consider whether and to what degree the
provision itself might further important First Amendment values. With
these positive values and the precedential authority of Red Lion, Justice
Stephen Breyer's concurrence added the missing theoretical considerations
to the debate. Justice Breyer looked to the purposes of the statute to
preserve the benefits of free broadcasting and promote widespread
202. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
203. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
204. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
205. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
206. Turner, 520 U.S. at 180.
207. Id. at 185, 213-14.
208. Id. at 234-35 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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dissemination of information as providing the basis for analysis. 2 09
Recognizing the important First Amendment values on both sides of the
issue, Justice Breyer reasoned that the policy of wide dissemination of ideas
"seeks to facilitate the public discussion and informed deliberation, which,
as Justice Brandeis pointed out many years ago, democratic government
presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to achieve." 210 Not only did
Justice Breyer recognize the positive value and role of state intervention to
promote widespread conveyance of ideas; he also cited Red Lion as
authority for that proposition.211 Justice Breyer's argument was significant
because it protected the space of appearances amidst the rather lifeless and
mechanical jurisprudence of both the majority and dissent in Turner. The
key operative question here was not which level of judicial scrutiny to
exercise, but rather what value is being promoted. Recall that the debate
over the level of judicial scrutiny is tethered to "content-neutral" analysis.
If the regulation is content-neutral, then courts employ "intermediate
scrutiny." If the regulation is content-based, the courts employ "strict
scrutiny." One can engage in "content-neutral" analysis with little or no
reference to the underlying First Amendment and democratic values that
ostensibly animate the judicial tests. 212 In asking what democratic values
are at stake, Justice Breyer reasoned within a broadly Arendtian vision of
the political world, which requires space for appearances and encounters in
the public sphere.
In its first foray into cyberspace, the Court in Reno v. ACLU 213
recognized the valid justifications for intervention into broadcast media in
cases like Red Lion.214 The Court distinguished, however, the provisions of
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)215 from other
regulations, because there was no history of regulation, scarcity of
resources, or a particular form of invasive communication. 216 Because the
space was wide-open without the problems of access encountered in other
broadcast media, the Court was properly sensitive to preserving that
openness as essential to free speech. 217 Justice John Paul Stevens's opinion
is bereft of any high-minded theories of autonomy or democracy, but
recognition of both is implicit in the opinion's concern that communication
209. Id. at 226 (Breyer, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 227.
211. Id. at 227 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)); see also
Owen M. Fiss, The Censorship of Television, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1215 (1999).
212. This approach is consistent with Justice Stephen Breyer's overall approach to
constitutional interpretation. Justice Breyer argues "that courts should take greater account
of the Constitution's democratic nature when they interpret constitutional and statutory
texts." Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 5 (2005).
213. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
214. Id. at 849.
215. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
216. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-70 (distinguishing, for example, Sable Communications of
California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), where government regulation of indecent as
well as obscene commercial telephone messages was "invasive").
217. See id. at 874.
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is kept wide-open. Further, what is perhaps most important in the context
of broadcasting cases is the recognition that the First Amendment can
protect speakers from being drowned out by other non-state speakers.
Stevens observed that the CDA, through its "knowledge" requirement
which silences speech at the moment the speaker becomes aware that a
minor is listening, invites listeners to silence speakers by posing as minors
on the Internet. He noted, "It would confer broad powers of censorship, in
the form of a 'heckler's veto,' upon any opponent of indecent speech who
might simply log on and inform the would-be discoursers" that a minor is
present.218 Thus, other speakers can restrict the space for speech, and the
Court has an affirmative duty to protect a speaker from being forced out of
the space of communication. Such a role is consistent with the broadcast
cases' concern for providing space for speakers. They are an attempt to
avoid not so much a specific "heckler's veto," but the functional
equivalent-crowding out from the relevant space to speak.219
The fundamental problem is this: As long as the Court focuses on
protecting procedural autonomy through "content neutral" analysis, there is
no guarantee that the content necessary for human freedom will appear.
Cultivating this content is not just a matter of slight adjustments to enable
more passive reception of a wider array of information. This content
requires the active participation in speaking and listening, of appearing and
being appeared to, as each individual creates an identity in public space.
Fostering this substantive account of autonomy requires more than a
negative injunction against content discrimination. It requires the active,
but careful, participation of Congress and courts in crafting social structures
that allow for and promote the plurality of human appearances. For there to
be substantive exchange through speech of ideas between autonomous
agents-the appearance of new ideas that Arendt advocates-there must be
space. However, judicial and legislative bodies have always circumscribed
that space. Hence, ducking the question of providing space for the
appearance of the new fails to acknowledge both the importance of
substantive autonomy and the responsibility to protect it.
The Court should start by listening carefully to Justice Breyer's
concurrence in Turner-much as the Court eventually listened to
Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney v. California.220 In order to ensure
public debate that is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," 221 it is important
that the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence be guided by the principle
that a plurality of human political appearances be made visible, including
218. Id. at 880.
219. Censorship justified by audience reaction has been upheld in cases such as Feiner v.
New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). An alternative approach to protecting speech is found in the
sporadic doctrinal history of the "heckler's veto"-which puts the State in the role of
insuring the openness of public space for speakers against private attempts to silence. See
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 (1966); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First
Amendment (1966).
220. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
221. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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both dissent and agreement. To this end, the Court must think beyond
content-neutrality and mere freedom of choice when the choices have been
socially (and judicially) structured. Since the "marketplace" in which ideas
occur is always already structured by the law,222 the Court's analysis can
never achieve the "neutrality" it purports to attain in evaluating state
regulations. 223 The Court must look at the substantive effects of the
"marketplace of ideas," for, left to its own devices, the space within that
marketplace may contain very little diversity of thought.
B. The Marketplace and "Public Forum "Analyses
So far the question of whether speakers have sufficient space on existing
venues has presupposed that a place for public discourse exists, whether it
is a traditional public forum, a special government-protected forum, or
some other private place. What happens, however, when there are too few
venues for speech in the first place? If the first rule of real estate is
"location, location, location," then something similar must be the case with
regard to free speech. That is, for public speech to occur, there must first be
a location for free speech. For dissent to be visible, there must first be a
place that can become a venue for expressing dissent and then space within
that venue. Locating free speech is a problem encompassed by the Supreme
Court's "public forum" doctrine, and one that is implied by the Court's
reliance on the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor.
One way in which the individual, liberated from exclusive concern with
the bare necessities of life, meets his or her needs is through exchanging
goods in a marketplace. To evoke the image of the "marketplace" is to
evoke the Greek tradition of the agora where men met as equals in the
marketplace, and where more than mere physical goods were exchanged.
Exchange of ideas and a meeting of equals was a vital aspect of the agora
where Socrates spent his time questioning the artisans, poets, and
politicians.224
The image of the marketplace has captivated the Supreme Court since its
introduction by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United States.22 5
There, Holmes wrote,
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
222. See, e.g., Post, supra note 137, at 1255 (arguing that speech occurs in "the social
contexts that envelop and give constitutional significance to acts of communication").
223. See Fiss, supra note 28; Sunstein, supra note 172.
224. Plato, Apology of Socrates, reprinted in Four Texts on Socrates 63 (Thomas G. West
& Grace Starry West trans., Cornell Univ. Press rev. ed. 1998).
225. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). David Cole provides an excellent
discussion of the role of creative misreading in the development of dissenting opinions into
majority doctrine, one example of which is the evolution of the "marketplace." See David
Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 Yale L.J.
857 (1986).
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the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. 226
The idea that truth will prevail over falsehood in a free exchange of ideas
has a rich tradition from Milton's Areopagitica227 to Mill's On Liberty.228
The value of free speech in the Miltonian tradition is found only in its
connection to revealing the truth. Under this view, competition is in service
of truth, as Justice Lewis Powell in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,229
expressed the point: "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as
a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition
of other ideas. '230 Central to Holmes's dissent in Abrams is also the idea
that we have imperfect knowledge and that "all life is an experiment,"
providing the seeds for the value of exchange itself.231
The specific conversion of Holmes's "free trade in ideas" into the phrase
"marketplace of ideas" occurs in Justice Brennan's concurrence in Lamont
v. Postmaster General.232  That decision invalidated a federal statute
allowing delivery of "communist political propaganda" only if the
addressee requested receipt in writing.233 Justice Brennan wrote, "The
dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing
addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers. '234 In Brennan's
voice, Holmes's interruption of the then-dominant free speech tradition is
focused not on the battle between truth and falsehood, but on the value of
exchange itself. Holmes's dissent became the foundation for a new
tradition in the Court's repeated use of the metaphor of "marketplace of
ideas," in which the values of truth and exchange are alternately
emphasized. 235
But what does a "marketplace of ideas" mean? It would seem, by simply
parsing the words, that there must be a market (understood as a forum or
channel of exchange), a place (understood as a location for that exchange),
and the presence of ideas (understood as the currency of exchange). The
ambiguity between a place, as in the agora, and a market process, as in
226. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
227. John Milton, Areopagitica, reprinted in The Prose of John Milton 265 (J. Max
Patrick et al. eds., 1968).
228. Mill, supra note 171.
229. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
230. Id. at 339-40.
231. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). This echoes the pragmatic
sentiments of John Dewey in lectures given in 1918, one year before the Abrams decision:
"Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are
really like." John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social
Psychology 190 (1930).
232. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
233. Id. at 305.
234. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
235. The "marketplace" metaphor has appeared in sixty-one Supreme Court cases since
Justice William Brennan's crafting of Holmes's idea.
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operation of Adam Smith's "invisible hand," has persisted in the Court's
use of the metaphor.236 Use of the "marketplace of ideas" seems to mean
simultaneously a place and a process of exchange. One might conclude that
the repetition of the metaphor has tended to empty it of any precise
meaning. One can thoughtlessly employ the phrase "marketplace of ideas"
in advocating any kind of inaction on the part of the Court or Congress to
sustain a feeling that in fact there is a place in which ideas are openly and
robustly exchanged. It is "thoughtless" because, like Smith's "invisible
hand," it is an abstraction.
By contrast to the invisibility of the "hand" of market exchange, the
agora was a physical place, protected and fostered, where citizens would
meet as autonomous agents engaging in a version of collective self-
determination. If we want to foster the appearance of ideas that can be
openly exchanged, then we must move beyond repetition of metaphors to
foster actual places of autonomous exchange. Nevertheless, in focusing on
the need to create and sustain actual places where persons become visible to
each other as autonomous agents, courts will do well to heed Judge
Cardozo's advice: "Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." 2 37
The Court has used the metaphor of the marketplace to suggest an open
forum for the appearance of truth. Witness the unanimous opinion in Red
Lion: "[I]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail .... -238 The Court also employs the marketplace metaphor to
support the Court's "content-neutral" analysis and its laissez faire
orientation to evoke a place where government intrusion is most
unwelcome. For example, Justice Stevens, in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,239 upheld the FCC's ability to censor "obscene language" from
the airwaves during times when children are likely to be listening.240
Justice Stevens, joined by two Justices, wrote "For it is a central tenet of the
First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the
marketplace of ideas."'241 Although the FCC's Declaratory Order that the
236. Critics too tend to focus on the importance of the market to the exclusion of
considering the importance of place. For example, Professor Vincent Blasi focuses on a
neoclassical view of commercial markets to argue that the market role-and not the truth-
seeking role--of speech "does not offer the prospect of wisdom through mass deliberation,
nor that of meaningful political participation for all interested citizens." Vincent Blasi,
Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 46. This reading is perhaps
closer to what Holmes wrote in Abrams, where he did not use the concept of "marketplace"
now attributed to him. He employed the phrases "free trade in ideas" and "competition in
the market." Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. However, the Court has taken on the "marketplace"
concept, which unavoidably calls attention to the need for a place where "free trade in ideas"
might occur.
237. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
238. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
239. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
240. Id. at 750.
241. Id. at 745-46.
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radio station was subject to administrative sanctions was undoubtedly
content-based, the Court reasoned that the interest in protecting children
from obscenity and the privacy interests of adults in their homes was
sufficient to grant power to the censor in the marketplace.242  Note,
however, that this intrusion in the marketplace, where the government must
remain neutral, was made on the basis of speech that the Court has
characterized as "low value" obscenity, which does not deserve full First
Amendment protection. The Court has carved out small exceptions to
neutrality in the marketplace-obscenity, 243 fighting words,244 libel,245 and
incitement to imminent harm.246 But, the exceptions to neutrality also serve
to prove the rule. In Pacifica, the rule of content-neutrality was specifically
tied to the "marketplace" metaphor.247 The doctrinal neutrality indicated
that the structural features of the market itself were not at issue for the
court.
Even Justice Brennan's dissent in Pacifica contained the "marketplace"
metaphor in service of neutrality. Justice Brennan would place the
responsibility for weeding out undesirable communication "in a public free
to choose those communications worthy of its attention from a marketplace
unsullied by the censor's hand."'248
Justice Brennan's dissent in CBS, however, broke with the tradition of
speaking of the marketplace in purely economic, neutral terms by making
clear the role of place in the "marketplace." 249 Brennan shifted the focus on
the "marketplace" from an occasion for exchanging ideas in pursuit of truth
to a meeting of individuals on political space requiring a real place:
"[F]reedom of speech does not exist in the abstract. On the contrary, the
right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective
forum-whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a
soapbox, or a radio and television frequency. '250 Without a public place
where individuals can gather, there is no place where the appearance of the
political can occur. Without a place of appearances, there can be no
political life.251 Thus, Justice Brennan importantly shifts the focus of the
"marketplace" metaphor to the need for place. This departs in important
ways from the Court's repeated treatment of the marketplace as a site of
neutrality in advocacy for truth.252 Yet, Brennan's dissent in CBS, while a
242. Id. at 749.
243. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
244. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
245. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
246. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
247. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745-46.
248. Id. at 772 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
249. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 175 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 193.
251. Brennan advocated the Meiklejohn theory of the democratic purposes of the First
Amendment. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965).
252. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) ("False statements of
fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the
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notable recognition of the importance of place to free speech values,
remains deeply embedded in the First Amendment tradition: "[I]t has
traditionally been thought that the most effective way to insure this
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate is by fostering a 'free trade in
ideas' by making our forums of communication readily available to all
persons wishing to express their views. ' 253 Here, Brennan utilized the
Holmesian tradition of the economic reading of "free trade in ideas" while
specifically grounding it in a place-a forum where individuals can appear
as citizens.
Brennan's dissent also highlights a concurrent strain in the First
Amendment tradition. The Court has employed what it calls a "public
forum" doctrine to cases where the issue is not simply about the fact that
something is being said, but the issue is about the fact of where it is being
said. From the Arendtian perspective, the fact that someone is able to speak
is inseparable from the need for that speech to have a place of political
appearance. The Court has long recognized that there can be exceptions to
its content-neutral analysis for restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
the speech. 254 The public forum analysis is a way to analyze when
restrictions based on the place of the speech are permissible.
In addressing regulation of the place of speech, the Court has carved out
distinctions within the category "public forum." In International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,255 the Court distinguished (1)
traditional public fora, such as parks and streets, described by Justice Owen
J. Roberts in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization as places that
"have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly; 2 56 (2) designated
public fora the state has opened for expressive activity; and (3) other public
property. 257 If the forum falls into either category (1) or (2) and the
marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual's reputation that cannot easily
be repaired by counterspeech ....").
253. CBS, 412 U.S. at 184 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
254. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (establishing the test for
regulation of nonspeech elements of speech). Time, place, and manner restrictions are
permissible, among other occasions, when they limit the locations of adult theatres, Young v.
Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 51 (1976) (concluding that the city's interest supports
the different treatment of adult theatres limiting "the place where adult films may be
exhibited," even though based on distinguishing content), restrict amplified music, Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasizing that the time, place, and
manner regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate government interest), and
restrict placement of tobacco products advertisements, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525 (2001) (holding that Massachusetts had demonstrated a substantial interest in
preventing access to tobacco products by minors and certain provisions had employed
appropriately narrow means to advance that interest).
255. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
256. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
257. See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)
(employing a tripartite framework to differentiate government property that is a traditional
public forum, government property that is an expressly dedicated forum, and non-dedicated
government property).
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restriction is related to content, then the Court applies strict scrutiny,
examining regulations to determine whether they have been narrowly drawn
to achieve a compelling state interest. If it is considering a category (1) or
(2) forum with a content-neutral restriction, then the Court applies
intermediate scrutiny. But if the forum belongs to category (3), then the
Court looks only to the reasonableness of the regulation, so long as the
regulation is not motivated by disagreement with the speaker's
viewpoint.2 58
In Krishna, the Court held that LaGuardia Airport is neither a traditional
nor a designated public forum and, therefore, restrictions on leafleting could
be deemed reasonable.259 Although the airport is publicly owned and open
to the public, the Court upheld a complete ban on leafleting on public
issues, a core feature of First Amendment political speech.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Krishna neatly summarizes what
makes this decision so analytically troubling: "Public places are of
necessity the locus for discussion of public issues .... At the heart of our
jurisprudence lies the principle that in a free nation citizens must have the
right to gather and speak with other persons in public places. '260 The Court
created a new set of distinctions among kinds of public fora and then
applied intermediate scrutiny to any regulation that could be reasonably
construed as content-neutral. This extends the general "content-neutral"
approach beyond the "marketplace" metaphor not only by supposing that
the competition for places to speak occurs within a neutral structure, but
also by using that neutrality to lower the level of scrutiny. Presently, the
mask of neutrality is used in conjunction with designating types of public
fora to diminish rather than enhance speech opportunities and locations.
Failing again to protect public access to fora where language and ideas
can flourish in public practice, the Court in United States v. Kokinda found
that the government may restrict speech on a public sidewalk leading to a
post office. 261 Because the Court claimed the sidewalk was not a traditional
or designated forum, it examined the prohibition only for reasonableness, a
standard easily met.2 62 Intuitively, one might consider post office grounds
a classic example of a forum in which persons congregate in public, if only
for brief periods of time. It is of little consolation to those seeking a forum
in which to exchange ideas that "the regulation does not discriminate on the
basis of content or viewpoint. '263
Because the value of public speech, particularly about public issues, is
central to the First Amendment, it follows that the Court has inverted the
jurisprudential goal. Rather than protect and foster places for individuals to
create their political identities, the Court purports to limit only the most
258. Krishna, 505 U.S. at 678-79.
259. Id. at 680.
260. Id. at 696.
261. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
262. Id. at 727.
263. Id. at 736.
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egregious forms of regulation. However, because airports and post office
sidewalks play an important role in public life, this limitation is vacuous.
Many "traditional" public fora no longer exist in any functional -ense. 264 In
most communities, one encounters few fellow citizens on the sidewalk
other than those passing by in cars. Parks and town squares are no longer
the central places for encountering fellow citizens that they once may have
been.265
Because the occasions for face-to-face encounters and discussions
between humans qua humans have become so few and so limited in scope,
the Court must begin to look at the role a specific location plays in fostering
occasions for political appearances. 266 If the place can be a place of
political appearance, then the Court must encourage its use and abandon
crabbed distinctions among kinds of public fora. At a minimum, this entails
extending heightened scrutiny to all regulations of place that have a
significant impact on speech. The Court's current categorization of place as
property takes priority over consequences to public speech and discourse. 267
This inverts the analytic priority of free speech. First, the overlay of public
fora categories to preserve property interests simply does not protect or
foster speech and should be abandoned. Second, to the extent that
categorizing public places according to their historical use is deeply
entrenched in judicial doctrine, heightened scrutiny should be adopted for
all regulations of place that have substantial effects on speech and public
discourse. The costs of failing to do otherwise are high.
Many famous public protests occurred fully within a public forum-for
instance the march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama along a public
highway in March, 1965. The district court in Alabama enabled this protest
by employing a very different test designed to foster, rather than suppress,
significant public protest. 268 Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., boldly weighed
264. The existence of traditional practices is the cornerstone of Justice Antonin Scalia's
theory of constitutional interpretation. If he persuades the Court to adopt this theory, we
could have a right to free speech but have no place to exercise it because "traditional" sites
and "traditional" practices cease to exist. An overemphasis on tradition necessitates the
disappearance of free speech, when tradition disappears. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 688 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If that long and unbroken
tradition of our people does not decide these cases, then what does?"); Rutan v. Republican
Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen a practice not expressly
prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open,
widespread, and unchallenged use.., we have no proper basis for striking it down."). It is
precisely free speech in the form of expressing political viewpoints that is endangered by the
construction of "protest zones."
265. For policy recommendations regarding the importance of encountering fellow
citizens in public places, see Mickey Kaus, The End of Equality 78-102 (1992).
266. Concern over the loss of the public sphere as a loss of occasions for persons, as
citizens, to encounter each other is central to Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin's recent
call for a new national holiday. See generally Ackerman & Fishkin, supra note 185.
267. See Calvin Massey, Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property,
50 Hastings L.J. 309 (1999).
268. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 106 (M.D. Ala. 1965). For an argument
defending the "principle of proportionality" of Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., against current
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the effects on public discourse with the asserted interests in maintaining
order in a way that gave effect to the importance of speech over regulation
of place. He wrote, "[I]t seems basic to our constitutional principles that
the extent of the right to assemble, demonstrate and march peaceably along
the highways and streets in an orderly manner should be commensurate
with the enormity of the wrongs that are being protested and petitioned
against."269
But the current, content-neutral, public forum analysis may not permit
such protest. The real concern is that our current First Amendment analysis
has legitimized the regulation of place such that future Selmas may never
come to pass. Less tolerance exists for mass protest movements, and even
for the random and isolated individuals carrying signs with statements like
"The Bushes must love the poor-they've made so many of us." 270 These
policies that chill speech and dissent diminish the public sphere, and
eliminate content we may never know. Although press reports about
protests against the WTO in places like Seattle, Quebec City, and Miami
focus mostly on the supposed violence of the protesters, in all of these
cases, officials created speech zones to prevent or limit the place of free
speech.271 Similarly, the 2000 GOP convention in Philadelphia essentially
"privatized" the whole downtown area so that there could be no visible
dissent. Such a policy foreclosed the issue of free speech by focusing
attention on the less controversial issue of protecting rights to property and
place.
These distinctions among public and nonpublic fora, however, apply only
to publicly owned property. The matter is altogether different if the place is
privately owned, but the problem is much the same. The modem agora,
one might argue, is the shopping mall. Like the Greek agora, the mall is a
site where citizens gather to exchange goods. However, unlike the Greek
agora, the shopping mall is not a "public forum" within the meaning of the
Court's criteria because the shopping mall is privately owned.
After a brief interlude in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,272 the Court has curtailed the right to speak
out in privately owned places. By employing precedent that allowed
canvassing of neighborhoods, Justice Thurgood Marshall sought to preserve
the right to picket at a supermarket, holding that "[t]he shopping center
premises are open to the public to the same extent as the commercial center
"forum analysis," see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating Selma: The Importance of
Context in Public Forum Analysis, 104 Yale L.J. 1411 (1995).
269. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. at 106.
270. This was a sign that retired steelworker Bill Neel was attempting to hold when he
was arrested in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, after he refused to go to the designated "protest
zone" out of sight of the press and President. See Lindorff, supra note 78.
271. See generally Aaron Perrine, Note, The First Amendment Versus the World Trade
Organization: Emergency Powers and the Battle in Seattle, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 635 (2001)
(arguing that even under current "time, place, manner" restrictions, Seattle's "no-protest
zone" violated the First Amendment).
272. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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of a normal town." 273 It was, however, a short-lived intervention in a long
tradition that has refused to extend First Amendment protection to private
places. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, Justice Powell permitted the exclusion of
anti-Vietnam war protesters from passing out leaflets in a Portland
shopping mall, reasoning that the First Amendment does not protect the
right of a trespasser or uninvited guest to speak on private property.274
Explicitly overruling Logan Valley, Justice Potter Stewart, in Hudgens v.
NLRB, concluded that "the constitutional guarantee of free expression has
no part to play" in a case where individuals sought to convey their views on
private property. 275 The individual autonomy of the property owners
provides the fundamental justification for excluding the "self-expression"
of others. Here, property trumps speech, pointing to the background
conceptions of place that may motivate the exclusion. The problem is that
the preservation of place in the First Amendment context is parasitic to
actual property-and property is "owned." There are no places for speech
to occur that are not already implicated in a property regime. 276
Justice Marshall's dissent from Tanner notes that increasingly private
places replace former public sites for gathering. Thus, "[i]t becomes harder
and harder for citizens to find means to communicate with other
citizens." 277 The freedom to speak is meaningless unless one has a place to
address one's fellow citizens. If there are no places for actual interaction,
then, as Arendt notes, the "real" world of political appearances cannot exist,
and our lives are directly impoverished no less than if we were to live under
tyranny. 278 If there is no publicly owned agora, it does not follow that the
agora is not necessary for political life. Indeed, the need for the Court to
identify the modem age's functional equivalent to the agora is all the more
critical absent a publicly owned, traditionally used agora.279 For, without
the agora, individuals cannot publicly appear. Without political
appearance, individuals cannot exchange the speech and action necessary
for political life. Without the meeting of citizens for speech and action,
273. Id. at 319.
274. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
275. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976). But see Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding a California Supreme Court ruling that the California
Constitution protected the rights of appellees to solicit signatures for a petition in a central
courtyard of a shopping center).
276. However, as Carol M. Rose argues, property itself has a communicative quality.
"[P]roperty looks like a kind of speech, with the audience composed of all others who might
be interested in claiming the object in question." Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of
Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 79 (1985). If one takes this view of property, then Justice
Potter Stewart may not be so far off base to oppose one form of speech-the communicative
function of property rights-with another form of speech-the political and deliberative. On
the importance of the public forum as "property," see Massey, supra note 267.
277. Tanner, 407 U.S. at 586 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
278. See supra notes 156-58158 and accompanying text.
279. Cyberspace is one place in which greater public interaction has most definitely
occurred. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 Yale L.J. 1805
(1995). For concerns about cyberspace and democracy, see Sunstein, supra note 22.
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there cannot be human freedom, and without freedom, there is no autonomy
left for the First Amendment to protect.
Human autonomy and democratic deliberation both require a space and a
place for appearances. Space requires a field or forum constituting a
defined place and room in relation to others in that place. Place provides a
location for free speech. These two concepts have analytically interacted
under current doctrine in ways unsatisfactory for either. For example, in
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, Justice Kennedy
was concerned that, if programmers were not free to exclude some
candidates for a political office from a televised debate, no debate would be
had at all.280 Thus, he refused to recognize that space on a debate forum
implicates core constitutional values going to the "essence of self-
government." 281 Instead, the Court feared that "[w]ere it faced with the
prospect of cacophony, on the one hand, and First Amendment liability, on
the other, a public television broadcaster might choose not to air candidates'
views at all."'282 Where access to a nonpublic forum is at stake, as opposed
to a traditional or nontraditional public forum, the Court uses an analysis of
place to deny a right to space on the forum by a speaker engaged in core
political speech.
We can only hope that Justice Marshall's analysis will yet bear fruit and
counter the univocality of the Court's use of the "content-neutrality,"
"marketplace," and "public forum" concepts. The use of these concepts
requires the Court merely to avoid procedurally suppressing autonomy and
speech; but mere reliance on procedural justice to protect and foster
autonomy is much too thin to ensure the actual existence of robust,
uninhibited speech. Captivated by its own picture of "content-neutrality,"
the Court does not attend adequately to the structural effects on substantive
human autonomy, deliberative democracy, and the public sphere, all of
which are necessary for the kind of public speech that the Constitution
aspires to protect.
C. Captive Audiences
One thesis of the previous two sections is that the Court has been held
captive by its own use of the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor and its
procedural rule favoring "content neutrality." The problem is that
remaining neutral is consistent with policies that would dislocate the very
place for the "marketplace of ideas." In order to produce a "marketplace"
lacking a wide assortment of voices from which to choose, the state need
not regulate content directly for that content to lack a plurality of views.
Indeed, one of the key problems with the "marketplace" metaphor is its
implicit assumption that the listener is a passive consumer of goods. The
listener is very much like the passive consumer in a supermarket.
280. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
281. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
282. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 681.
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Consumers walk down the aisle and choose a brand of cereal, already
packaged in the appropriate forum with a designated space. Such imagery
is problematic because autonomous agents are not passive choosers, and
robust democratic collective self-determination does not exist in passive
form.2 8 3 Ideas are not packaged by a parliamentarian from above like the
grocer who chooses, arranges, and presents a range of goods on a
supermarket shelf. Ideas need to be presented to and acknowledged by
persons engaged in dialogic exchange in the manner envisioned by Arendt.
This Article argues that a particular picture of autonomy has dominated
the Court's jurisprudence. The Court has focused on the passive virtues of
procedural autonomy rather than the active participation of individuals in
the public sphere. This notion of passivity is central to the Court's "captive
audience" doctrine. In upholding a city ordinance prohibiting picketing in a
residential neighborhood, the Court provided the following: "The First
Amendment permits the government to prohibit offensive speech as
intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the objectionable
speech. ' 284 The idea is that people are coerced into being listeners, and the
paradigmatic instance seems to be unwanted speech directed at the home.285
Under this reasoning, the First Amendment protects the passive individual
who should not be "coerced" into listening or speaking. The Court does not
look at the content of a possible exchange, or the degree to which the
captive audience is treated as a potential interlocutor in a debate occurring
in a public place. Rather, since the situation is one in which the listener had
no "choice" but to listen, the Court decided that such picketing violates the
First Amendment.
The Court has also employed this doctrine in the context of political
speech in a state owned bus. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, the
Court upheld the city's policy of refusing to sell to candidates for political
office advertising space on advertising placards placed inside and outside
the bus. 286 The city was free, however, to sell advertising space to purely
commercial interests. In a mix of public forum and captive audience
analysis, the Court held that the passengers on the bus are a captive
audience and "reasoned that viewers of billboards and streetcar signs had no
'choice or volition' to observe such advertising. '287 Further emphasizing
the point, Justice Harry Blackmun wrote for the majority that the transit
system "[u]sers would be subjected to the blare of political propaganda. '288
The Court's reasoning suggests that if the speech is political propaganda
then one should not be forced to listen. But, as Justice Brennan noted in
283. The problem of passivity is closely connected to the loss of the public sphere. See
Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign
Finance (2002); Kaus, supra note 265.
284. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
285. Id.; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
286. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
287. Id. at 302.
288. Id. at 304.
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dissent, there is no small irony in the Court's "sanction[ing] the city's
preference for bland commercialism and noncontroversial public service
messages over 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues
[that] would reverse the traditional priorities of the First Amendment. '289
The majority was concerned about "lurking doubts about favoritism, and
sticky administrative problems [that] might arise in parceling out limited
space to eager politicians." 290  There was no worry that, by placing
advertising in the same space, the state might appear to endorse particular
commercial products, though the reasoning would be equally valid. By first
deciding the prior question about the role of the place-whether a public or
nonpublic forum by tradition or government designation-the Court
prefigured how the issue of speech was to be treated. If the place is a
nonpublic forum, then control "can be based on subject matter and speaker
identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral." 291
What is troubling about Lehman is that the Court does not protect the
existence of a forum, even for core political speech. Though the
"marketplace of ideas" is meant to provide all the exchange necessary for
autonomous agents to participate in collective self-determination, the Court
paid insufficient attention to the very existence of places that can become
markets. Furthermore, the very idea of protecting a "captive audience"
presumes that an audience is not actively engaged in the exchange of ideas,
but is passively receptive to whatever the given social structure presents to
it-in this case, commercial, but not political, ideas. Lehman is also
dangerous because it lives on through public forum cases like Kokinda,292
as we have seen, which fail to recognize the importance of protecting public
places of appearance. 293
Lehman inverted the order of priority between political and commercial
speech. The normal doctrinal hierarchy typically provides political speech
more protection than commercial speech. This repeated the Court's
reasoning a year earlier in CBS v. Democratic National Committee in which
the Court held that the First Amendment does not require commercial
broadcasters to accept paid editorial advertising concerning issues of public
concern.294 There, Chief Justice Burger explicitly admitted the strange
irony of protecting commercial speech but not political: "The Commission
is also entitled to take into account the reality that in a very real sense
listeners and viewers constitute a 'captive audience.' . . . It is no answer to
say that because we tolerate pervasive commercial advertisements we can
also live with its political counterparts." 295
289. Id. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 304 (majority opinion).
291. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
292. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
293. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
294. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
295. Id. at 127-28.
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These two cases represent an extraordinary judicial disdain for the
political and a trenchant captivation by a particular image of autonomy.
The captive audience doctrine tethers the Court to a mistaken picture of
social reality (the pervasiveness of commercial speech which we cannot
choose to avert), and of the nature and role of autonomy (the passive
chooser), and of place. The mistaken image of social reality stems from a
belief that the Court can meaningfully distinguish cases in which one has
choice or volition in what one hears, and cases in which one does not. First,
all acts of listening involve a certain component of "captivity." We are
constantly inundated with messages. Simply from commercial speech we
constantly receive messages from billboards, radio ads, newspaper ads, and
television ads. It would be impossible to walk or drive through any
populated area without being compelled to receive commercial messages.
Second, there is the social reality of interacting with others. One is
captive to the speech of others simply by being in their presence. The
presence of other human beings pervades our lives; and perhaps our
"captivity" to the presence of others nowhere manifests itself more clearly
than in the workplace. Only by becoming a hermit can one exercise "choice
and volition" over whether or not to hear the speech of others. Most of us
must work, and hence cannot exercise "volition" not to hear the messages
of workplace colleagues. 296 No social distance from others exists to give us
such a choice. Action in the presence of others requires a constant openness
to the appearance of reciprocal, and sometimes uninvited, acts of
communication.
The Court's image of the passive chooser is thus inadequate and
misleading. We do not passively consider the reasons for interacting with
others in a whole host of social situations. The Court's reasoning is thus
mistaken about both the nature of social reality and autonomous choice.
We are all captives to others' speech-and it is a good thing too.297 Or, to
put the point in Justice John M. Harlan II's words, "That the air may at
times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of
weakness but of strength. '298
Arendt urges the abandonment of this captivating picture of people as
passive receivers of language rather than active engagers in speech. But the
Court persists in sustaining its own picture of the passive individual before
whom the world is but a play of ideas, some of which the individual might
296. Professor Balkin also rejects the coherence of captive audience doctrine. Resonating
with my approach here, he suggests that captive audience doctrine "should regulate
particular situations where people are particularly subject to unjust and intolerable
harassment and coercion .... [The doctrine] should protect people in coercive situations, not
places." J. M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2295,
2312-13 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
297. Stanley Fish goes further by arguing that all speech acts are constrained, not free.
They are constrained by (1) one's purposes and interests; (2) selection which always leaves
aside something else one might have said; and (3) consequences. See Stanley Fish, There's
No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing Too, Boston Rev., Feb. 1992, at 3.
298. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
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"choose" to purchase in the "marketplace." The Court would do well to
abandon its doctrine of captive audiences and focus instead on fostering
social situations and structures that insure the existence of the kinds of
places where we can all be captive to the flow of ideas in the Court's much
vaunted "marketplace of ideas."
D. Doctrinal Consequences and Solutions
The problem with "protest zones" may be obvious to most observers
from the very beginning. It seems patently antithetical to core First
Amendment values to make dissent disappear "over there" in a protest zone,
or under the train tracks, or in a metal cage. The problem in First
Amendment policy and doctrine, however, is that too little attention has
been paid to the role of place. Thus, since, in principle, such dissent is
proscribable by virtue of where it occurs-in a "public" place-the Court
must rethink its policies regarding place. As a simple recommendation, it
might be fair to say that where some may not gather, none should. That is,
if there can be no putative "protestors" then there should be no viewers of
presidential events at all. But that would fully undermine our democratic
system, and, by implication, so too does shunting "protestors" out of sight.
For the autonomy and deliberation of all, all must be visible and all must
share public space and place. To the extent that public officials are
concerned about maintaining order in the public sphere to avoid a
cacophony of speakers, something like Meiklejohn's or Fiss's "fair minded
parliamentarian" may be appropriate. 299 Silencing everyone is not.
One implication of the argument put forth in this Article-that we can
only promote our other values of autonomy and deliberation if we attend to
the policy implications of place-is that the Court should abandon rules that
allow the foreclosure of speech by prior determination of the status of the
forum in which the speech occurs. Speech should take analytic priority
over place. Public forum analysis begins with a categorization of place and
ends with a conclusion about the regulation of speech. Instead, analysis
should begin with the regulation of speech and end with a conclusion about
speech. This claim does not mean that the location of speech cannot be
considered for purposes of regulation. It does mean that place cannot be
used as a tool of "content neutral" analysis to control and regulate speech
without fully considering the consequences to public discourse. Place can
be "viewpoint neutral," but no regulation that has the effect of eliminating
speech from the public sphere can be, strictly speaking, "content-neutral."
What we need is to develop a new way of thinking about the place of
speech as centrally important to all First Amendment policy and practice.
We need to give speech the "pride of place."
The judicial presumption should favor speech and place for speech.
"Place as property" should only rarely be allowed to trump speech,
299. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
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particularly when that speech is political and aimed at public discourse.
Where the content of speech figures into the reasoning state regulators
employ to control "secondary effects," it would be wise to utilize
heightened scrutiny. One way to address the doctrinal problems inherent in
the Court's "public forum" doctrine presented in this Article is to adopt
heightened scrutiny across all fora rather than applying strict scrutiny to
restrictions on traditional fora, intermediate scrutiny to restrictions on
designated public fora, and "reasonableness" scrutiny to restrictions on
nonpublic fora.300 No doubt, more exacting scrutiny of restrictions on use
of nontraditional fora would result in more decisions protecting speech.
Doctrinal revision attempting to reconcile conflicting and confused Court
decisions by tinkering with the standard of review, although helpful, misses
the broader point. More than altering the level of scrutiny, however, we
need a reorientation that gives speech priority over place, and that
recognizes the importance of public places for speech to occur and the
importance of space on existing venues for a plurality of voices. Moreover,
raising the level of scrutiny under existing doctrine accepts that it is
appropriate to distinguish analytically between traditional public fora and
nontraditional fora when it comes to considering the effects of regulating
place on speech. It accepts that analytically, place is to be considered
before speech. An example of how to avoid giving place analytic priority
over speech is Judge Johnson's "principle of proportionality" in the Selma
case.30 1 New terms of analysis such as these would enable the Court and
commentators to foster new doctrinal approaches aimed at better protecting
and fostering public discourse.
A second implication, though not a direct focus of this Article, is that
local decisions made by actors such as mayors and local police chiefs can
allow speech to flourish in a broader range of places. Creating a culture
that values the public expression of speech and that recognizes the value
and need for public appearances is a project for us all, not merely for nine
supreme jurists. Fundamentally, as Arendt argues, we protect public
appearances for public discourse not simply for its instrumental value for
deliberation, but for the intrinsic value of creating citizens in their fullest
form.
Within the doctrines of public fora and media access, the figure of the
dissenter is rendered invisible. Without space or place for her appearance,
we lose something at the heart of the free speech tradition.302 It is in
thinking about the role of place and how it functions in relation to our other
300. This kind of approach is suggested in Matthew D. McGill, Note, Unleashing the
Limited Public Forum: A Modest Revision to a Dysfunctional Doctrine, 52 Stan. L. Rev.
929 (2000); see also Massey, supra note 267.
301. See Frank M. Johnson, Civil Disobedience and the Law, 44 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1969).
302. "[T]he First Amendment serves to encourage and protect those who speak out
against established customs, habit, institutions, and authorities-whether or not they inhabit
the public sphere.... [I]t supports the American ideal of protecting and supporting dissent
by putting dissenters at the center of the First Amendment tradition." Shiffrin, Dissent, supra
note 1, at 128.
2636 [Vol. 75
DISPLACING DISSENT
values such as liberty, autonomy, and deliberation that one is required to
first ask when regulating speech by regulating place is appropriate. This
call for dialogue is a call within a rich free speech tradition. As Justice
Kennedy observed, "As society becomes more insular in character, it
becomes essential to protect public places where traditional modes of
speech and forms of expression can take place. '30 3
CONCLUSION
This Article presents an argument about the role of place in First
Amendment theory and policy. It seems obvious that we need a place from
which to exercise our First Amendment rights. But, as we have seen, the
Court's doctrine with regard to place and space does not view the point as
quite so obvious. Indeed, like property ownership, public fora are already
distributed by either tradition or statute. Tradition is a kind of adverse
possession right for places to speak, alterable by practice or legislative
decree. Architects and urban planners have bemoaned for years that we
have lost a sense of space and place in how we interact with our fellow
denizens.304 What has been less often noted is the loss of a sense of place
in our policies of speech. This observation does not entail the need for a
large, overarching theory, but it does entail an urgent concem-particularly
given the direction of policy in an era increasingly dominated by concerns
over public security. We have shed places and spaces-airports, sidewalks,
malls, and even street comers-with no accompanied gain in the robust
appearance of forms of autonomy or deliberative democracy. 30 5 Dissent is
increasingly displaced with the consequence that the figure of dissent is
increasingly disappearing from public discourse. As Justice Kennedy
observed concerning the rigid application of the public forum doctrine, "In
a country where most citizens travel by automobile, and parks all too often
become locales for crime rather than social intercourse, our failure to
recognize the possibility that new types of government property may be
appropriate forums for speech will lead to a serious curtailment of our
expressive activity. '306 We would not sound any alarms if "our expressive
activity" referred only to the dominant discourse of the dominant group
who possessed a monopoly on venue and programming. Yet, as we have
seen, the values of free speech are directed towards the possibility of
something new, what Arendt calls natality, which in its very nature must
303. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
304. See, e.g., Peter Calthorpe, The Next American Metropolis: Ecology, Community,
and the American Dream 17 (1993) (advocating new urbanist neighborhood design in which
"[a]t the core of this alternative, philosophically and practically, is the pedestrian"); Michael
J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy 334-36
(1996) (looking at the social consequences of land use decisions).
305. Perhaps an exception to this, however, is the Internet. See supra note 279 and
accompanying text.
306. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 697-98 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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make its initial appearance as dissent. Thus, "our expressive activity" to
which Justice Kennedy refers is centrally the activity of dissent. 30 7
From the perspective of free speech theory, both the values of human
autonomy and deliberative democracy require a robust protection of the
places and spaces for speech and public discourse. As this Article has
demonstrated, current Supreme Court doctrine does not effectively protect
speech from the supposed content-neutral regulation of place. Speech is
suppressed through control of the places and spaces where speech occurs.
Doctrinal adjustments, such as mandating heightened scrutiny for all
regulations of place that have substantial consequences for speech and
public discourse, would no doubt protect and foster more speech. This
Article argues that, at a minimum, the Court should adopt such doctrinal
changes. Yet more than technical doctrinal solutions are needed. We need
to rethink and rearticulate the importance of public places for our free
speech tradition in the way broadly indicated by Hannah Arendt's political
philosophy. Personhood and human autonomy can only exist and develop
in fullest form within social structures that provide public places and spaces
for human interaction and discourse. Recognizing this fact has
repercussions for land use development, local police practices, public
transportation, methods of issue advocacy, political advocacy and elections,
as well as judicial doctrine under the First Amendment. This Article has
diagnosed the problem and sketched the broad parameters of a solution.
The details will be found in the conversation that follows.
We celebrate the development of the free speech tradition, and indeed we
should. However, what is seldom noted is the price we have paid, and the
grounds upon which this achievement stands. 308 Eugene Debs served a
lengthy prison sentence, as did Charles T. Schenk and many others
prosecuted as political dissenters. After decades of living in error, the
Court corrected its philosophical vision, interrupting the direction of its
doctrine and recognizing with Brandeis that the vitality of our democracy
rests on openness and exchange. We must not forget that our self-
congratulated tradition has not been achieved without the misery of some.
And furthermore, the cost of suppressing core political speech cannot be
measured. Because we cannot hear what has not been uttered, and because
we cannot see what has been made invisible, the shape and development of
the political body will remain distorted by the constitutional failures to
protect and promote the places where "We the People" make our
appearances.
307. See Shiffrin, Dissent, supra note 1, at 18 (arguing that "[t]he commitment to dissent
and the First Amendment is of national symbolic value: it is a form of cultural glue that
binds citizens to the political community").
308. There are notable exceptions. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens (2003); Stone, supra
note 38. Stone's book is about the fact that "the United States has a long and unfortunate
history of overreacting to the perceived dangers of wartime. Time and again, Americans
have allowed fear and fury to get the better of them. Time and again, Americans have
suppressed dissent, imprisoned and deported dissenters, and then-later-regretted their
actions." Stone, supra note 38, at 5.
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Totalitarian regimes during the twentieth century sought to employ terror
to foreclose the possibility of human appearances and to forbid, out of fear
of human creativity, what Arendt calls natality. The ability to create
something new through human action appearing before other human beings
is indeed threatening to the established order. For the very condition of
natality is opposed to the kind of control that seeks to preserve the
established order. But Brandeis was, and continues to be, correct in
perceiving that those who won our liberty
believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is
an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this
should be a fundamental principle of the American government. 309
The stakes for understanding and cohering First Amendment doctrine to
a robust vision of the place where human autonomy might appear, one that
promotes the fullest sense of collective (a shared political world) and self
(identity) and determination (acting and creating the world) are no less than
the importance of human existence itself: "A life without speech and
without action... is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human
life because it is no longer lived among men."3 10
309. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
310. Arendt, The Human Condition, supra note 142, at 176. We should, however, edit
Arendt to say "lived among human beings."
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